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Abstract 
This thesis presents the results of my doctoral studies at Middlesex University. 
It contains three studies on human capital investment, education and cognitive 
abilities. The first study follows a macro approach and assesses the impact of 
various human capital measures on productivity. The main finding of this 
chapter is that human capital quality has a larger impact on economic growth 
than human capital stock, while the distribution of human capital also plays a 
role. The second chapter explores specific microeconomic issues of human 
capital by studying parental expectations in rural Peru. The main finding is 
that both time and risk preferences are important factors associated with 
expectations. Lastly, the third chapter deals with cognitive abilities by 
presenting the results of a meta-study on the Cognitive Reflection Test. The 
results suggest that males are likely to perform better on the test, while the 
monetary incentive have no significant impact on test performance. 
Furthermore, regarding the implementation of the test we find that overall 
students perform better, while having the test after an experimental session 
negatively impacts test performance.  
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Introduction 
This thesis presents the findings of my doctoral studies at Middlesex University titled 
‘Essays on Human Capital’. It consists of three main chapters dealing with the 
related topics of human capital, education and cognitive abilities. I am following a top 
down approach by first discussing macroeconomic issues related to human capital 
and later delving into two specific micro level applications including mother’s 
educational expectations in developing countries and drivers of performance on a 
cognitive ability test. 
In Chapter One ‘Education, education inequality and growth’ I investigate the 
channels through which human capital affects economic growth by looking at both 
the direct impact of the investments in education and the way educational resources 
are distributed within society.   
Investments in human capital have been long identified as important determinant of 
growth in macroeconomic theory (Becker 1964, Schultz 1981, Romer 1986). Education 
increases the human capital available in the labour force, which in turn enhances 
labour productivity, eventually leading to a higher equilibrium level of output 
(Mankiw et al. 1992). Education also increases the innovative capacity of an economy, 
and the newly obtained knowledge on new products, processes and technology 
stimulates growth (Lucas 1988; Romer 1990a). Furthermore, education may enable 
the transmission and diffusion of knowledge required to process and understand new 
information and to successfully implement new technologies developed by others, 
which in turn promotes economic growth (Benhabib and Spiegel 2005). 
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Despite the indisputable theoretical impact of human capital, there is mixed 
empirical evidence in this area in the literature (see Pritchett 2001, 2006; Lenkei et 
al. 2018).  
There are several reasons that may have led to the mixed conclusions in the past 
including both empirical and methodological issues. First, there are measurement 
issues. Typical proxies for human capital in the macroeconomic literature are 
schooling attainment measures (average years of schooling) such as the ones provided 
by Barro and Lee (2013), Cohen and Soto (2007) or the Penn World Table (Feenstra 
et al 2015). An issue with these measures is that they assume that an extra year of 
schooling provides the same increase in skills and knowledge regardless of the 
education system of the country. This has led to another branch of studies in the 
literature suggesting that accounting for the quality of education may be a more 
appropriate determinant (Hanushek and Kimko 2000, Hanushek and Wößmann 
2007). One of the objectives of the first chapter is to shed light on some of the 
unresolved issues that still plague the applied macro literature. 
The second issue relates to the distribution of human capital. When increasing mean 
education levels in the population, governments (especially in developing countries) 
face the question whether they should allocate resources to improve education levels 
of the already educated segments or to involve the wider society to provide basic 
education and alleviate illiteracy rates. The chapter also recognises that it is not just 
the accumulation of human capital that plays a role in determining growth but also 
its equal (or unequal) distribution. If the ability of a nation’s population is normally 
distributed, then a skewed distribution of educational opportunities will lead to 
welfare losses. Thus, an equitable distribution of human capital constitutes a pre-
requisite for substantial gains in productivity (Thomas et al. 2002). Nevertheless, the 
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empirical findings are not conclusive in the literature regarding education inequality, 
thus the chapter will aim to bring some resolution to this issue.  
The third issue on human capital concerns which framework to apply to model the 
true relationship between human capital and growth. Although the Neoclassical 
model is theoretically sound, it does not necessarily capture the dynamic long-run 
relationship between the variables, particularly when estimated for a large number 
of highly heterogeneous countries. Therefore, based on the works of Eberhardt and 
Teal (2013) and Lenkei et al. (2018), the chapter adopts an Error Correction Model 
(ECM) representation, which controls for both the long-run (accumulation effect) and 
short-run (growth effect) of human capital on growth. This approach also provides a 
more general way of specifying the role of human capital as it encompasses the other 
models in the literature (first difference specification; Benhabib and Spiegel (1994); 
Sunde and Vischer (2015)). Furthermore, it allows to take full advantage of the 
characteristics of the dataset such as long time dimension and availability of a panel 
of countries.  
The results suggest that changes in average years of schooling between 2003 and 
2015 do not significantly affect growth by using any of the educational attainment 
measures (BL, PWT, CS). However, initial levels of human capital do have an impact 
in a way that higher levels of initial average years of schooling in 2003 significantly 
contributes to higher growth over the observed time period. The results on human 
capital quality provide some evidence that quality (captured by PISA mathematics 
score) has a somewhat stronger impact as the magnitude of our quality coefficients 
are larger, although their effect is only weakly significant. Negative coefficients are 
observed for educational inequality, however they remain insignificant.  
10 
 
In contrast, the ECM framework (preferred model) predicts changes in human capital 
stock have played an important role in increasing productivity across countries. This 
is consistent across all three measures of human capital (BL, CS and PWT). In 
addition, human capital coefficients are larger a sub-sample of developing countries. 
This is consistent with previous findings in the human capital literature (e.g. Lenkei 
et al 2018). The dynamic panel data model also finds significant evidence that in the 
long-run a more equal distribution of education within societies (measured by 
educational GINI) leads to higher changes in income per worker. Overall, the 
empirical finding using the ECM framework support the view that in the long-run 
government policies should focus on allocating national resources to improve 
educational attainment and also distribute these investments equally across the 
population, as educational inequality has a negative impact on output growth. 
 
In the second chapter the focus remains on human capital but in a microeconomic 
context. An individual’s skills and knowledge obtained through education can be 
transformed into human capital. In turn, as established in the first chapter, human 
capital can be an important determinant in boosting growth in the long-run. This is 
particularly important for developing countries as it facilitates the technological 
catch-up process to developed countries. However, despite some recent advancement 
in providing basic education to children in developing countries, 57 million children 
are still said to be out of school and over 100 million lack basic literacy skills 
(UNESCO 2015). There are several factors that may prevent efficient investment in 
education in developing counties. First, education has a high opportunity cost as it is 
long-term commitment in the sense that years of investment are required before the 
returns can be realised (Becker 1964). Second, education is also considered to be a 
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risky investment for households due to uncertain school qualities. Third, there are 
several issues related to parental preferences and decisions that driving   
Parental expectations are also considered to have a substantial economic and social 
impact on the household. High expectations lead children to set higher standards for 
their education and to make greater demands on themselves from an early age which 
in turn results in high achievement, better attendance and more positive attitudes 
towards school (Boocock 1972, Astone and McLanahan, 1991, Peng and Wright 1994, 
Reynolds 1998, Davis-Kean 2005, Yamamoto and Holloway 2010). At the same time 
low parental educational expectations can be transmitted through generations and 
they may create a vicious circle and reinforce poverty. In consequence, low parental 
educational expectations may reduce attendance, academic achievement and 
successful labour market outcomes for children.  
Due to the long-term commitment and riskiness of educational investments in 
developing counties, Chapter 2, investigates whether parent’s willingness to take risk 
and their patience impacts their educational expectations.  
Data from a field experiment in Peru is used to analyse the relationship between 
expectations on children education attainment and parental risk and time 
preferences among rural households. After controlling for a set of household, parental 
and child characteristics I find that the risk-aversion parameter, sigma, is 
significantly and positively related to expectations on schooling choices.  There are 
three main explanations to these results. First, parents with high levels of risk 
aversion report higher expectations about their children’s education as they likely 
perceive education for their children a less risky option. Therefore, parents consider 
high levels of education as a safe option. Second, if at an early child age mothers have 
low expectations and consequently low schooling investment there is a risk of losing 
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out on future returns to human capital which can significantly affect the wealth of a 
low-income household. Third, all subjects were participants of a governmental 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme. A risk averse parent makes sure that 
their child has adequate primary school attendance and one of the spill-over effects 
of the CCT program is that it may increase future expectations beyond primary level. 
This may have important policy implications as it shows the effectiveness of 
conditional cash transfer programmes in improving human capital accumulation.  
Moreover, a higher degree of impatience (higher discount rate) among mothers is 
significantly correlated with low expectations on children’s educational choices. This 
suggests that parents with high discount rates are more impatient to wait for the 
returns to schooling and therefore they may tend to underinvest in human capital.  
While past studies analysed the role of risk and time preferences of parents in 
determining parental investments both in developed countries (e.g. Germany, Wölfel 
and Heineck (2012)) and developing countries (e.g. Uganda, Tanaka and Yamano 
(2015)), to the best of the author’s knowledge no study has estimated the association 
between risk and time preferences of parents and parental expectations for the 
children in low income countries. This study is also different from previous studies in 
this field in the sense that there are no observations of actual parental behaviour but 
predictions under uncertainty about future children outcomes. 
 
The third chapter of the thesis also deals with the micro dimension but now looks at 
individuals and their cognitive abilities. As the first chapter discusses, human capital 
quality (i.e. cognitive skills of a population) may plays a more important role in 
driving growth compared to the quantity (schooling attainment) (Hanushek and 
Wössmann, 2007). Cognitive abilities can be regarded as an important dimension of 
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human capital; along with education, health and non-cognitive abilities (Heckman 
and Rubinstein 2001; Banks and Mazzonna 2012), with most policy makers accepting 
the notion that they can be a key driver of schooling outcomes. Furthermore, they are 
also fundamental for decision making and play a crucial in the formulation and 
subsequent execution of saving and consumption plans (Banks and Oldfield 2007). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is ongoing debate about measuring of human capital. 
In particular, for cognitive abilities educational outcomes have been often used as a 
proxy given that these abilities are not easily observed. However, there are an 
increasing number of alternative measures in economics that are gaining popularity, 
one of which is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). In chapter three I delve deeper 
in the discussion and analysis of the main drivers of performance on the CRT by using 
a meta-study approach.  
The CRT was first proposed by Frederick (2005) and since then has been extensively 
used in the Experimental Economics and Psychology literature. Frederick proposed 
the test based on a dual-system theory (e.g. Epstein 1994; Sloman 1996; Stanovich 
and West 2000; Kahneman and Frederick 2002) made up of two cognitive processes: 
System 1, executed quickly without much reflection and System 2, more deliberate 
and requiring conscious thought and effort. The questions in the CRT have an 
immediate (intuitive) incorrect response (System 1). However, the correct response 
requires some deliberation, i.e. the activation of System 2.  
Frederick (2005) found that individuals with high CRT scores are more patient and 
more willing to gamble in the domain of gains. He also provided evidence that the 
CRT scores are highly correlated with some other tests of analytic thinking (e.g. 
American College Testing [ACT], Scholastic Assessment Test [SAT], and Writing 
Proficiency Test [WPT]) and that males on average score higher on the test. Toplak 
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et al. (2011) claim that the CRT can be viewed as a combination of cognitive capacity, 
disposition for judgement and decision making. They argue that the CRT captures 
important characteristics of rational thinking that are not measured in other 
intelligence tests.  
The use of the Cognitive Reflection Test as a covariate to explain behaviour in 
Economics and Psychology experiments has significantly increased in the past few 
years. Experiments have shown its usefulness in predicting behaviour. However, 
little is known about if the test is gender biased, whether incentives matter or how 
different implementation procedures impact outcomes.  
The chapter reports the results of a meta-study of 118 Cognitive Reflection Test 
studies comprising of 44,558 participants across 21 countries. Regarding the gender 
bias it is found that (i) males perform better in every CRT questions, (ii) females are 
more likely to answer none of the questions correctly, and (iii) males are more likely 
to answer all three questions correctly. This observation is important if one is 
interested in constructing samples based on cognitive ability. This could lead to 
strong (gender) sample imbalance. (For instance, if one uses three correct answers as 
a selection criterion then the sample is disproportionately biased towards males). The 
second finding is that there is no statistical evidence to support the argument that 
monetary incentives may play an important role in improving CRT performance. 
Albeit limited (no data on the amount, or how subjects were paid), this result is 
important as it shows that incentives may not be strongly relevant for the 
implementation of the CRT. Therefore, it may increase the effort that test takers 
exert when attempting to answer questions, but on average it does not necessarily 
result in higher CRT scores.    
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Regarding implementation procedures, taking the test at the end of an economic 
experiment negatively impacts performance. Conducting the test later decreases the 
probability of obtaining correct answers; meanwhile, the probability of obtaining 
none correctly is increased. This result is interesting as it points towards the fact that 
increased cognitive load could be an important determinant of performance in the 
CRT. When comparing student and non-student populations, we found that students 
are more likely to answer all three questions correctly compared to non-students, and 
less likely to have zero correct answers.  This tells us that the explanatory power of 
the CRT may be affected by population differences. In addition, mixed evidence 
obtained on whether the sequence of questions matters. Finally, it is found that 
computerised tests marginally improve test results. 
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Chapter 1.  
Education, education inequality and growth  
This study investigates the channels through which human capital affects economic 
growth. We look at both the direct impact of investments in education and at the way 
educational resources are distributed within society.  In fact, this study recognises 
that it is not just the accumulation of human capital to play a role in determining 
growth but also its equal (or unequal) distribution. Our analysis relies on a variety of 
techniques and measures of human capital and on a measure of educational 
inequality based on the Gini coefficient. First, using a long differences model we 
compare the performance of different measures of human capital, capturing both the 
quantity and quality of education, as well as education inequality.  Second, we assess 
the long run relationship of human capital accumulation and educational inequality 
on growth using a method that encompasses previous specifications and estimates 
both short-run and long run effects. Overall, our results support the view that 
government policies should focus on improving the quality of education and allocating 
national resources to education equally across the eligible population, as educational 
inequality has a negative impact of output growth in the long-run.   
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1. Introduction 
In the 21st century one of the most important policy issues facing governments is 
education and educational investments. Education may not only be beneficial for the 
individual but there might be spill-over effects at the macro level that would provide 
support for educational reforms in both developed and developing countries (Sianesi 
and Van Reenen 2003).  
Education increases the human capital present in the labour force, which in turn 
enhances labour productivity, eventually leading to a higher equilibrium level of 
output (e.g. Mankiw et al. 1992). Education also increases the innovative capacity of 
an economy, and the newly obtained knowledge on new products, processes and 
technology stimulates growth (e.g. Lucas 1988; Romer 1990a). Furthermore, 
education may enable the transmission and diffusion of knowledge required to 
process and understand new information and to successfully implement new 
technologies developed by others, which in turn promotes economic growth (Benhabib 
and Spiegel 2005)1.However, despite the widely shared view that human capital is an 
important determinant of growth in both macro- and microeconomic theory, there is 
                                                          
1 At the individual level education has been found to contribute to better health outcomes (Cutler and 
Lleras-Muney 2008), lower fertility rates (Martin 1995, Basu 2002) and improvement in the health of 
women’s children (Currie and Moretti 2003); it also reduces the incidence of criminal activity (Lochner 
and Moretti 2004) and helps in overcoming addictions (Sander 1995); furthermore, it also supports 
marriage market outcomes (Lefgren and McIntyre 2006) and more rational decision making (Goll and 
Rasheed 2005). 
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mixed empirical evidence in this area (For extensive review of the literature see Topel 
1999; Krueger and Lindahl 2001; Pritchett 2001, 2006; Lenkei et al. 2018).  
The objective of this study is to provide some resolution to the mixed evidence and 
unresolved issues on the relationship between human capital and growth that are 
still present in the macroeconomic literature. Firstly, it’s still unclear whether the 
quantity or the quality of human capital plays the main role in accounting for growth. 
We attempt to contribute to the debate through contrasting a number of measures of 
both quantity and quality of human capital using the most up to date datasets. Our 
main human capital quantity proxies are average years of schooling measures 
including the Barro Lee, Penn World Table and Cohen and Soto datasets. Despite the 
imperfection of these variables (e.g. De la Fuente and Domenech 2006), their 
advantage is that they are available for a large number of countries for a long time 
period. In order to measure the quality of human capital we make use of the PISA 
test scores, which allow a standardised cross-country comparisons of students’ 
cognitive abilities and the overall effectiveness of education systems.  
Second, we shed light on whether a more equal distribution of human capital within 
the general population is associated with faster growth. Despite governmental efforts 
across the globe to reduce inequality in education over the past few decades, in many 
countries gaps in education between various groups is still substantial. If people's 
abilities are normally distributed, then a skewed distribution of education 
opportunities represents large welfare losses. Assuming that the amount of human 
capital of a person is the outcome of a combination of abilities and education, 
inequality in education would therefore lower the average level of human capital in 
the economy and consequently slow economic growth (Klasen 2002).  However, the 
empirical literature provides mixed evidence on its impact, with some studies 
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generally supporting the argument that inequality hinders growth (Castello and 
Domenech 2001; Thomas et al. 2002), while others do not find significant effects (Ram 
1984; Foldvari  and van Leeuwen 2011) or suggest that the impact of completed 
higher education is a more important driver of economic prosperity compared to 
general accessibility to lower levels of schooling (Gennaioli et al 2013; Squicciarini 
and Voigtlander 2015; Castello-Climent et al. 2017). Hence, the main issue is not only 
whether to devote Government resources to education, but whether such resources 
should be invested on a restricted elite or towards mass education. The objective of 
this study is to shed light on these issues in the applied macroeconomic literature.  
The third contribution of this study is related to the applied analytical approaches. 
Besides making use of traditional methods of empirical analysis such as the first 
differences specification, the study investigates the role of human capital on growth 
using an innovative analytical framework. This method allows us to test directly the 
validity of the restrictions imposed by some of the most commonly used empirical 
models e.g. first differences model. Following the work of Eberhardt and Teal (2013) 
and Lenkei et al. (2018), we adopt an Error Correction Model (ECM) representation 
that controls for both the long-run (accumulation effect) and short-run (growth effect) 
of human capital on economic growth.  
Over the past few decades economic and financial integration between countries is 
ever increasing. Thus, our panel data may exhibit cross-sectional dependence in the 
error terms due to common shocks such as the global financial crisis (Chudik et al. 
2011) and the presence of spill-overs (Eberhardt et al. 2013). If the unobserved 
components that create interdependencies across-cross sections are correlated with 
the independent variables our estimates become biased and inconsistent (De Hoyos 
and Sarafidis 2006). Therefore, our econometric approach involves using the mean 
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group estimator, while also controlling for heterogeneity and unobserved common 
factors causing cross-sectional dependency (Eberhardt and Teal, 2013; Eberhardt and 
Presbitero 2015).    
Overall our result provide evidence that the quality of human capital is marginally 
more important in explaining growth than the quantity of human capital. In addition, 
we found that in the long run the increase in average years of schooling and the 
decrease in educational inequality positively contribute to productivity growth. 
Overall our results support the argument that instead of focusing on educating the 
elites, more resources should be allocated to the educational involvement of a larger 
share of the population.    
The remaining of the study is structured as follows. In the next section we provide 
some background information on the literature in investments in human capital. 
Section 3 describes the analytical framework used for our analysis, while Section 4 
provides a descriptive analysis of the data used in the study. Section 5 presents the 
results and discussion of the empirical analysis, while Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. Background  
There are several reasons that may have led to mixed conclusions on the role of 
human capital for economic growth in the past, which include both methodological 
and empirical issues. The first issue is how to measure and compare across countries 
and time the competencies and skills of individuals at the macro level. The challenge 
is to find a good proxy for the conceptual human capital investment in theoretical 
models.  
Over the past few decades, the literature has been using a diverse range of measures 
(Mason et al. 2012). One of the most commonly used proxy is based on the average 
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years of schooling for the population and the percentage of population receiving 
different levels of education from Barro and Lee (BL) (Barro and Lee, 2013). The main 
advantage of these measures is that they are available for several countries for 
extended time periods; however many researchers argue that they measure 
attendance rather than attainment and as such they are input rather than output 
variables (e.g. Sianesi and Van Reenen 2003; De la Fuente and Domenech 2006; 
Mason et al. 2012). Furthermore, they are based on formal education only, without 
accounting for other human capital effects such as job training or home education; 
they do not capture quality of education only the quantity; and that different 
educational levels have varying impact on growth (Lenkei et al. 2018). Cohen and 
Leker (2014) have developed an alternative dataset for average years of schooling 
based on Cohen and Soto (2007) (CS). The most important differences between the 
BL and CS datasets is that CS employs a different approach to extrapolate missing 
data, use more census observations and change values they consider implausible 
(Ciccone and Papaioannou 2009). The availability of the Barro-Lee (BL) and Cohen 
and Soto (CS) dataset provides an opportunity to compare both. Another broadly used 
educational variable for human capital is available in the Penn World Table (PWT 
9.0) (Feenstra et al 2015). The PWT combines both the BL and CS measures of human 
capital into one dataset by correcting for their imperfections.  
Studies based on these measures have produced mixed evidence on the impact of 
human capital on growth (for a discussion on data quality of human capital measures 
see de la Fuente and Domenech 2006, Cohen and Soto 2007, Portela et al 2010, Mason 
et al 2012).  
Attainment of formal qualifications such as number of degrees have been also 
extensively used in the literature (e.g. Shapiro 2006), as they have the advantage to 
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better capture the quality of human capital. However, these measures suffer from the 
issue of international comparability across diverse educational systems. Thus, 
another emerging segment of the human capital literature deals with the link 
between internationally comparable measures of education quality and the ability of 
countries to grow over time. This literature argues that the cognitive skills of a nation 
(as a measure of human capital quality) are more important in measuring the impact 
of human capital on growth compared to years of schooling (e.g. Hanushek and Kimko 
2000; Hanushek and Woessmann 2007), because using the educational attainment 
measure assumes that an extra year of schooling provides the same increase in skills 
and knowledge regardless of the education system of the country. For instance, it is 
assumed an additional year of schooling in a developing country would create the 
same increase in productive human capital as in the US or EU. This ignores the cross-
country differences in educational quality as an extra year of schooling delivers 
different skills depending on the efficiency of a particular education system to 
transfer knowledge to students. Moreover, many countries have reached a point 
where expanding the accessibility to basic education provides little marginal benefits 
for growth and instead governments should focus on improving the quality of 
education (Hanushek 2010). 
Although we use the words schooling and human capital synonymously, an important 
distinction has to be made between schooling on one hand and skills and knowledge 
on the other. Therefore, another drawback of years of schooling as a measure of 
human capital is that it assumes that all human capital and skills is obtained through 
formal schooling (Hanushek and Woessman 2007). This ignores the possibility that 
there are various other factors outside the class room that contribute to improvement 
in cognitive skills and knowledge including family environment, friends, outside 
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school activities, private tutors and on-the-job training. Thus, a measure of cognitive 
skills would be more suitable for cross-country comparisons of human capital. Recent 
research has identified these skills as an important dimension and there is very large 
payoff to them. Individuals with higher cognitive skills systematically do better than 
the ones with less, and nations with more skilled population tend to grow faster 
(Hanushek and Kim 1995, Hanushek and Kimko 2000). Some evidence suggests that 
these returns to education are even higher in emerging economies compared to 
developed countries (Knight and Sabot 1990; Behrman et al 2008), and may even 
increase over time due to spill-over effects (Lucas 1988). This allows developing 
countries with less technological capabilities to catch up more rapidly to technological 
leaders (Barro 1991).  
Much of the debate about educational quality, which also captures cognitive skills, is 
centred around how to measure it. It is a challenge to find the same standardised 
measure that compares cognitive skills, and thus the quality of education, across 
countries and time with such diverse educational systems. In the literature the most 
commonly used proxies for quality are tests conducted by international agencies 
measuring students’ cognitive skills, particularly focusing on science and maths. 
Among these international tests one popular measure is the PISA test score. For 
OECD countries the PISA scale historically has a mean of 500 and a standard 
deviation of 100, while developing countries that participate in the tests usually 
perform substantially lower. These measures are found to be positively and 
significantly related to economic growth in the past (Hanushek and Kimko 2000, 
Hanushek and Woessmann 2007). Furthermore, years of schooling measures such as 
BL tend to become insignificant when labour force quality measures are included, 
indicating that they are likely to be highly correlated.  
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Educational inequality 
When increasing mean education levels in the population, country governments face 
a trade-off: should they focus on improving the education levels of the already 
educated segment of the society or instead they should allocate resources on involving 
the wider population to alleviate illiteracy rates and to provide basic education (e.g. 
Birdsall 1996)? The former would lead to larger, while latter to lower educational 
inequalities within nations. This dilemma has led to another area of human capital 
research that has been receiving increasing attention in recent years; the extent to 
which inequality in educational attainment within a society can hinder economic 
growth.  
If skills are normally distributed within the population then a skewed distribution of 
educational opportunities will lead to substantial welfare losses. Education 
inequality represents an opportunity cost in the form of foregone salaried 
employment and earnings in an economy (Thomas et al. 2002). Thus, an equitable 
distribution of human capital constitutes a pre-requisite for improvement in 
productivity and reduction in poverty at the macro level. Education also builds assets 
and improves social welfare by its spill-over effects on health, political participation, 
reduction in crime rate, social trust (Lochner 2011; Hout 2012; Borgonovi and Burns 
2015; Hooghe et al. 2015) which in turn will positively affect growth (Green and 
Henseke 2016). Therefore, ensuring access to educational opportunities is essential 
for the welfare of both developed and developing nations.   
In the past few decades, both developing and developed countries have made a great 
effort to lower illiteracy and to involve the wider society into receiving education. It 
is estimated that inequality in the distribution of education has been more than 
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halved as the average Gini coefficient dropped from 0.55 in 1960 to 0.28 in 2005 
(Castello-Climent and Domenech 2014). Yet, the empirical findings in the literature 
are not always conclusive about the impact of education inequality. Some early 
studies use standard deviation of educational attainment in growth regressions to 
capture the effect human capital inequality. For example, using the standard 
deviation of years of education as a measure of educational dispersion for a sample of 
43 countries Birdsall and Londono (1997) analyse the impact of initial distribution of 
land, income and human capital on output growth and obtain a negative effect for 
education inequality. In a similar manner, Lopez et al. (1998) find that for a panel of 
12 Asian and Latin American countries between 1970 and 1995, the standard 
deviation of education tends to have a negative impact on per capita income. 
However, one issue with standard deviation is that it is an absolute measure of 
dispersion thus it does not control for differences in the mean of the distribution.  
Using the educational Gini coefficient constructed from the Barro and Lee (1996) 
data, Thomas et al. (2002) and Castello and Domenech (2002) also find that a more 
equal distribution contributes to higher income per capita. Inequality in educational 
achievement and earnings inequality are also found to be correlated (Bedard and 
Ferral 2003, Blau and Khan 2005).  
However, some other studies do not find similar significant effects of human capital 
inequality either through using variance of schooling (Ram 1984) or educational Gini 
coefficient (Foldvari and van Leeuwen 2011) measures. Furthermore, some other 
studies even find that higher inequality leads to higher productivity. For example, 
using a sample of 29 Indian states Gille (2015) obtains a negative relationship 
between equality in education and income per capita.  While some other studies that 
look at the contribution of the upper tail of the human capital distribution, highlight 
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that the impact of completed higher education is a more important driver of economic 
prosperity compared to general accessibility to lower levels of schooling (Castello-
Climent and Mukhopadhyay 2013, Gennaioli et al. 2013, Cantoni and Yuchtman 
2014, Squicciarini and Voigtlander 2015, Castello-Climent et al. 2017).  
In addition, existing studies often use the classical first differences model to estimate 
the impact of inequality, which may not be able to capture these effects when using 
a large sample of heterogeneous countries (Islam 1995, Mason et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, the first differences model captures short run economic effects and does 
not account for long run relationships. Therefore, we also investigate whether a more 
equal distribution of human capital within the general population is associated with 
faster growth accounting for both short-run and long-run effects. We choose to utilise 
the Gini coefficient index (van Leeuwen and van Leeuwen-Li, 2015) in analysing 
educational inequality as it is normally the one also used in international 
comparisons of income distribution2,3.   
 
                                                          
2 There has been a great interest among researchers in assessing inequality through the use of such a 
simple index as the educational Gini coefficient. Despite its popularity there are some limitations 
associated with it. Deininger and Squire (1996) argue that changes in the coefficient do not explain 
whether educational redistribution is from the top educated to middle educated or an increase by the 
share of the bottom educated at the expense of the middle educated. Frankema and Bolt (2006) suggest 
that the lower the average years of schooling in a country, the bigger the effect of the gap in average 
years of education between individuals on the Gini coefficient. Therefore, a higher average level of 
educational attainment lowers the Gini coefficient. 
3 The issue with other measures such as the standard deviation is that it is an absolute measure of 
dispersion therefore it does not control for differences in the mean of the distribution. 
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3. Analytical Framework  
The literature has also raised the issue of how to model the true relationship between 
human capital and growth. Therefore, in this section we provide a discussion on the 
empirical implementation of our analysis that involves various data sources and 
estimation techniques, allowing us to account for the different growth channels of 
human capital, check the robustness of our results and compare them with existing 
evidence.  
3.1 Theoretical model 
We begin our analysis between human capital and growth by utilising the Solow 
(1956) growth model. The three-factor aggregate production function with labour and 
capital (physical and human) as inputs can be represented as: 
          Yit=Ait Fi(Lit, Kit, Hit)                                                                                (1) 
where Yit denotes the level of aggregate output in the economy, Lit is the quantity of 
labour (or number of workers or hours worked), Kit is an estimate of the capital 
services provided by the stock of equipment and structures used to produce goods and 
services and Hit is the education and skill level of a country’s workers. Ait is a 
multiplicative factor referred to as total factor productivity and it reflects the general 
level of productivity or technology in the economy.  
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function and constant returns to scale, we can 
modify the Equation (1) by dividing it by Lit which gives us:  
             yit=αit 𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛽1
ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝛽2
 (2) 
where yit (Yit/ Lit) defines the output per worker or average labour productivity which 
is a function of the amount of capital available per worker (kit =Kit/ Lit) and human 
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capital per worker (hit =Hit/ Lit). By taking the logarithms and first differencing 
Equation (2) we obtain:  
Δlnyit = α + β1 Δlnkit + β2 Δlnhit + εit         (3) 
where Δlnyit is the growth rate in GDP per employed person from period t-1 to period 
t, while εit is a stochastic error term capturing all omitted factors. Parameter β1 
accounts for growth in physical capital while β2 accounts for the growth effects in 
human capital. According to the Neoclassical economic theory the role of human 
capital is essential, as once the economy reaches its steady state, physical capital 
deepening cannot be the sustained source of growth in the economy (Mankiw et al. 
1992). This model has been extensively used in the literature but often leading to 
insignificant effects of human capital (e.g. Islam, 1995, Mason et al., 2012).  
It has been debated in the literature whether it is the levels of human capital or the 
year on year changes in years of schooling is a more important factor affecting growth. 
For example, based on the works of Romer (1960) and Nelson and Phelps (1966), 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) develop a model where the stock of human capital enters 
the specification. They assume that human capital influences growth via two 
channels: by facilitating the catching-up process with the technology leader and by 
affecting the country's ability to produce new technologies:  
Δlnyit = α + β1lnhit-1 + β2Δlnkit + β3Δlnyit-1 + εit       (4) 
Both, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and later Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2007) have 
found that educational levels are important drivers for growth, but not changes in 
education level. Other studies such as De la Fuente and Doménech (2006) and Cohen 
and Soto (2007) find statistically significant evidence on the positive effect of changes 
in education and economic growth. There are also studies that find strong support for 
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both human capital accumulation and human capital level (Ciccone and Papaioannou 
2009).   
The latter mechanism is discussed and estimated in Sunde and Visher (2015). These 
authors identify two specific roles for human capital: on the one hand changes in 
human capital might accelerate growth by augmenting the existing factors of 
production, while on the other hand (initial) level of human capital is responsible for 
the diffusion and adaption of new technologies or through innovation. Estimating the 
changes but leaving out the initial level of human capital can lead to biased estimates 
if, as predicted by theory, growth is indeed affected by the initial level of human 
capital (Sunde and Vischer, 2015). In order to capture both the effect of changes and 
levels of human capital they extend the Neoclassical model, which can be formally 
can be written as  
Δlnyit = α + β1Δlnhit + β2lnhit-1 + β3Δlnkit + β4Δlnyit-1 + εit      (5) 
where the human capital parameters are reflected in β1 and β2, where Δlnhit refers to 
the changes in our measures between time t-1 and t, while lnhit-1 is the initial level 
of human capital in period t-1. The β1 reflects the effects of human capital in terms 
of increase in factors (Solow 1956, Lucas, 1988) while β2 accounts for the growth 
effects in human capital due to higher adaptiveness to changing environment (Nelson 
and Phelps 1966). Finally, vector lnyit-1 controls for the initial level of GDP per capita4.  
 
                                                          
4 Other control variables have been included in related models in the empirical literature including 
growth in physical capital. 
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3.2 A more general model specification 
Although the model we presented earlier is theoretically sound, it does not necessary 
account for the dynamic relationship between human capital and economic growth. 
In the second part of the study we further extend our analysis through a model that 
can account for both short and long run impact of human capital. Several previous 
studies mention the possibility that the classical first differences growth model is not 
necessarily a suitable to capture the relationship between human capital and growth, 
particularly when estimated for a large number of highly heterogeneous countries 
(Islam 1995, Mason et al. 2012, Sunde and Vischer 2015). This issue has been 
addressed in Lenkei et al. (2018) with reference to a group of Asian counties. Their 
study shows that accounting for countries’ heterogeneity and cross-sectional 
dependence in a dynamic panel environment is possibly a more suitable approach for 
estimating the short and the long-run effects of human capital accumulation. The 
objective of this section is to extend the methodology of Lenkei et al. (2018) to a wider 
number of countries including both OECD and emerging markets.  
Following the works of Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran et al. (1999) and 
Eberhardt and Teal (2013); Lenkei et al. (2018) extended the first differences model 
and proposed that an alternative way of looking at the relationship between human 
capital and growth is to assume that such relationship follows an autoregressive 
distributed lag model, which we assume for reasons of simplicity to be of the first 
order ARDL (1,1,1): 
lnyit = μit + δ10i lnkit + δ11i lnkit-1 + 𝛾10i lnhit + 𝛾11i lnhit-1 + λlnyit-1 + εit                   (6) 
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Equation (5) explains movements in output per worker using the lagged level values 
of the dependent variable and lagged and current values of all inputs. The previous 
equation can be also specified as an error correction model (ECM)5:  
Δlnyit = ϕi (lnyit-1 - θ0i - θ1i lnkit-1 - θ2i lnhit-1) + δ10iΔlnkit + δ20iΔlnhit + εit                (7)       
This specification allows us to analyse both the long run and the short-run impacts 
of human capital on growth. Specifically, coefficient θ2i captures the stock effect of 
human capital, or its long-run impact, while the effect of short run adjustments is 
controlled for by the first difference coefficient δ20i.  
Fixed capital per worker is also allowed to affect growth both in the short and in the 
long run, via the coefficients θ1i and δ10i, respectively. The coefficient ϕi is the speed 
of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. Equation (7) provides a more general 
approach for the empirical analysis of the relationship between growth and human 
capital and allows us to differentiate between various theoretical approaches. In 
addition, given the availability of a panel of countries with a long-time dimension, 
this modelling framework will take full advantage of the characteristics of the 
datasets.  
Education versus education inequality 
Thomas et al. (1999) argue that the distribution of education (and human capital) is 
also an important factor for growth models because education is only partially 
tradable. If an asset is not completely tradable, then the marginal product of the asset 
across individuals is not equalised, and there is an aggregation problem. In this case, 
                                                          
5 See Appendix 1 for steps to work out equation (7). 
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aggregate production functions not only depend on the average level of the asset but 
also on its distribution.  
To measure the impact of education inequality on growth in a dynamic model we 
apply a similar approach as earlier. Output per worker is estimated using the lagged 
level values of the dependent variable and lagged and current values of physical 
capital and the educational GINI coefficient:  
lnyit = μit + δ10i lnkit + δ11i lnkit-1 + 𝛾10i lnGINIit + 𝛾11i lnGINIit-1 + λlnyit-1 + εit         (8)  
Alternatively, in an error correction model specification Equation (8) can be re-stated 
as:  
Δlnyit = ϕi (lnyit-1 - θ0i - θ1i lnkit-1 - θ2i lnGINIit-1) + δ10iΔlnkit + δ20iΔlnGINIit + εit        (9)       
Overall, we would expect to see that education inequality has a strong negative 
statistical relationship with per capita GDP growth which is in line with previous 
studies (Thomas et al. 1999; Lopez et al 1999).  
                             
4. Descriptive analysis  
There are two main sources of macroeconomic databases that we utilise in this study. 
The first one is the Penn World Table (PWT) version 9.0 (Feenstra et al. 2015), that 
provides data for all countries in the sample on real GDP at current PPPs and capital 
stock at current PPPs (both in mil. of 2005 USD). Secondly, we compute GDP per 
worker by supplementing the PWT data with employment series from The 
Conference Board (2018). We use GDP per worker as it is conceptually more 
appropriate in growth-accounting regressions and reflects better countries’ 
productive capacity (Pritchett 2001). 
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We contrast three different measures of human capital. The first measure is the 
Barro and Lee (2013) (BL) human capital variable which is the most commonly used 
measure in the economic growth literature (e.g. Islam 1995, Krueger and Lindahl 
2001). It provides data on the average years of education for the population aged 15 
and above. Observations are available every 5 years for 146 countries between 1950 
and 2010. The gaps between observations were filled using linear interpolation. Since 
the data is only available until 2010, in the analysis we will extrapolate this variable 
until 2015. 
The second human capital indicator is the Cohen and Soto (2007) series (CS) which 
has been updated by Cohen and Leker (2014). Just like the BL dataset it displays the 
average years of education for the population aged 15 and above. However, compared 
to BL it only provides educational attainment data every 10 years over the period of 
1960 and 2020 for 95 countries. The key differences between the BL and CD datasets 
are that the CS use more census observations, employ a different approach to 
extrapolate missing data, and change values they consider implausible (Ciccone and 
Papaioannou 2009).  
Lastly, in addition to the BL and CS human capital indicators, the series from the 
Penn World Table (PWT) is also used. The PWT 9.0 human capital index series is 
available for 150 countries over 1950 to 2014 period and combines data from both BL 
and CS correcting some of their shortcomings.6 
                                                          
6 It is a challenge to construct data on the average years of schooling in the population. It 
requires combining information from population censuses with information on school 
enrolment with significant inconsistencies in classification systems across counties. The PWT 
presents a more systematic comparison of data from these censuses.  
37 
 
As discussed earlier, the literature argues that instead of the average years of 
schooling, data on education quality better captures the impact of human capital on 
growth as it provides a more accurate representation of the education systems across 
countries (Hanushek and Woessman 2011)7. In order to analyse the effect of human 
capital quality, we make use of the PISA student scores of cognitive abilities. The 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a two-hour test for 15-
year-old students conducted every 3 years. It aims to evaluate education systems 
worldwide by testing students’ skills and knowledge in maths, science and reading 
comprehension. In the 2015 wave data was collected in 70 countries however there 
are only 55 countries where the test was conducted every occasion since its inception. 
The PISA tests are considered to be competency based tests. More specifically, it 
evaluates education systems by assessing how can students apply their obtained 
knowledge in real life situations at the end of their compulsory education and be 
equipped for adult life.  
In order to measure inequality in educational attainment across countries and time 
we make use of the educational GINI coefficient (van Leeuwen and van Leeuwen-Li 
2015). The Gini of the spread of education in the total population aged 15 years and 
older is available annually for the period 1850-2010 (the time period varies by 
country)8. This variable was also extrapolated until 2015.   
                                                          
7 There are also critiques of the international cognitive tests in the literature. Some of the 
most mentioned critiques include outcome of the tests has no consequence on their school 
attainment, students have little incentives to provide correct answers and that they are only 
based on a subsection of the curriculum including science and maths (Pistaferri 2011). 
8 See Appendix 2 for the detailed description on constructing this coefficient.  
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In the first part of our analysis, in order to make our results comparable across 
different measures we restrict all our macro and human capital variables to PISA 
participating studies between 2003 and 2015. Table 1 presents summary statistics of 
all variables used in our empirical analysis.   
Table 1. Summary statistics – Part 1 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Real GDP per worker (Y/L) 649 64.6 34.8 5.2 240.2 
Real capital stock per worker (K/L) 649 248.8 136.7 13.2 640.5 
Barro and Lee: avg. years of schooling 649 10.4 1.7 6.2 15.0 
Penn World Table: avg. years of 
schooling 
649 3.0 0.4 2.0 3.7 
Cohen and Soto: avg. years of schooling 451 10.5 2.0 5.2 13.6 
PISA mathematics 649 465.9 56.4 284.5 573.5 
PISA reading 649 465.7 51.0 272.5 565.4 
PISA science 649 472.3 52.6 289.8 569.5 
Education Inequality 539 18.4 8.4 4.0 45.9 
 Note: Sample restricted to PISA participating countries between 2003 and 2015 
 
The shortcoming of the PISA test is that it is being conducted in mainly developed 
and some emerging countries. However, it is estimated that the return to educational 
quality maybe even larger in emerging economies (Hanushek and Woessmann 2007), 
although this effect cannot be suitably captured by this data set. The other issue is 
that the test is relatively young (maximum of 5 observations for each country until 
2015).  
Figures 1-6 display the correlation between the changes in human capital and 
changes in GDP per worker between 2003 and 2015. The three human capital 
measures of average years of schooling (Figures1-3) suggest a positive but quite weak 
relationship, while the three PISA test measures (Figures 4-6) indicate a positive and 
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relatively stronger correlation between our variables of interest. It is also worth 
noting that the data tend to be more dispersed along the trend line when using the 
average years of schooling measures (Figures 1-3), while the PISA measures (Figures 
4-6) are less dispersed. This suggests that on average quantitative factor such as 
average years of schooling differ more across education systems than the qualitative 
aspects. These figures are in line with other studies that find similar correlation 
between changes in human capital and economic growth (Hanushek and Woessman 
2007).  
All six figures also show the presence of outliers. For example, on Figures 1 & 2 we 
observe that Kazakhstan has experienced the largest growth and one of the smallest 
changes of average years of schooling, while on Figures 4-6 the country’s above 
average growth in output per worker was coupled with significant improvements in 
the country’s PISA scores. This suggest that the Kazakh policymakers over the 
observed period were investing in the enhancement of schooling quality and 
development of students’ cognitive skill, rather than expansion of schooling 
attainment. We observe somewhat similar patterns for Malaysia and Argentina i.e. 
modest improvement in average years of schooling but substantial gains in the 
quality of schooling. However, for example Qatar has produced large changes in both 
areas indicating that that the government has been focusing on allocating resources 
to education improving both accessibility to basic education in all parts of the society 
while at the same time improving the quality of their system. 
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Figures 1-6. Relationship between GDP per worker and human capital 
         Fig.1     Fig.2 
 
                     Fig.3      Fig.4 
        
         
 
 
 
 Fig.5      Fig.6 
      
 
Following the works of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Sunde and Vischer (2015), 
in Appendix 3 we test whether there might be a potential bias in our estimates if we 
only account for just one channel in which human capital affects growth. On Figures 
(A1-A6) we plot the relationship between initial levels of human capital in 2003 and 
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subsequent changes in these variables between 2003 and 2015 using average 
schooling measures (BL, PWT, CS) and PISA scores (maths, science reading). All 
figures display a strong and negative correlation between the variables. This suggests 
that the higher the initial level of human capital the lower the subsequent percentage 
change in average years of schooling. These results are in line with previous findings, 
suggesting that due to the negative correlation between the initial level and changes 
in human capital, if any of them are omitted from the regression the estimates should 
be biased downwards.  
We again observe that the average years of schooling measures of human capital are 
more dispersed around the trend line, while there is a clearer relationship between 
the variables using PISA.  Interestingly Singapore, that topped the PISA tables in 
2015, has experienced some of the largest changes in average years of schooling 
(Figure A1 & A2), but they have not made substantial gains in PISA scores over the 
observed time period (Figures A4-A6). This is because the country already had above 
average initial achievement scores on the PISA test and most probably the 
government was rather focusing resources on improving average attainment for the 
wider society.  
On Figures A1-A2 we obtain some outlier observations as countries such as 
Argentina, Kazakhstan and Malaysia and Qatar have had the smallest initial level 
of PISA scores, however they have seen the largest improvement. However, besides 
improving on their education quality, Qatar has also seen large gains in their average 
years of schooling figures from the low initial levels.  
Finally, Figures 7-8 present the correlation between changes in educational 
inequality and changes in GDP per worker and initial inequality, respectively. Both 
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plots display a positive correlation between our variables, although neither of the 
correlations are robust. Figure 7 suggests that on average changes in educational 
inequality are positively correlated with changes in GDP per worker, while Figure 8 
indicates that higher initial inequality is positively correlated with higher percentage 
change in subsequent educational inequality, i.e. inequality appears to be persistent. 
This finding is slightly puzzling because it does not meet our prior expectations and 
it contradicts parts of the literature (e.g. Castello and Domenech 2002).  
                 Figures 7-8. Relationship between inequality and 
                        GDP in per worker and initial inequality 
 
   Fig.7.       Fig.8. 
 
 
One may argue that since the human capital inequality was linearly interpolated 
since 2010 we might obtain biased correlation estimates. In Appendix Figure A7 we 
re-created Figure 7 using the average educational inequality between 2003 and 2015 
instead of changes in inequality. However, we obtain results similar to those shown 
in Figure7, suggesting that countries with higher average educational inequalities 
have seen the largest changes in output per worker between 2003 and 2015. An 
interesting example is China that has one of the highest educational inequality in the 
world and also has seen the smallest changes in these figures but produced one of the 
largest changes in output per worker during the period under analysis.   
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5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Traditional Model  
Table 2 presents the estimates of our average schooling measures (BL, PWT, CS) in 
growth regressions. All estimates on changes in human capital are negative and 
insignificant when we do not account for initial levels of human capital (Columns 1,4 
and 7). These findings are in line with previous findings reported in the literature 
(e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; Sunde and Visher 2015). The specification with the 
initial average years of schooling (Columns 2,5,8) provides positive and significant 
effect of initial human capital on growth which is consistent with previous studies 
(e.g. Makiw et al 1992). This suggests that a higher initial level of average schooling 
provides a larger change in GDP per employed person. Once we account for both 
channels (Columns 3,6,9), the Δ lnh estimates turn positive for BL and CS measure 
but not for the PWT, however all three coefficients remain insignificant. This finding 
is in line with the conjecture that weak empirical evidence obtained in previous 
studies might have been a result of omitted variable bias. Overall, our results suggest 
that the levels are more important factors in affecting productivity as compared to 
changes in human capital.   
We replicate the previous table in Table A1 (Appendix) using short instead of long 
differences in the regression specifications between 2003 and 2015. We obtain similar 
results as in Table 2, however the coefficients on the initial level of human capital (ln 
ht-1) become insignificant. 
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Table 2. Growth Regressions using average schooling HC measures 
  ______Barro and Lee_____ _____Penn World Table_____ ______Cohen and Soto_____ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                 
Δ lnh -0.134  0.159 -0.461  -0.050 -0.225  0.131 
 (0.190)  (0.169) (0.409)  (0.429) (0.320)  (0.419) 
Ln ht-1  0.270** 0.328**  0.306** 0.292*  0.176 0.211 
  (0.124) (0.126)  (0.144) (0.148)  (0.119) (0.153) 
Δ lnk 0.095 0.099 0.108 0.100 0.116 0.115 0.082 0.097 0.105 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.097) (0.089) (0.093) (0.096) (0.108) (0.111) (0.110) 
Ln yt-1 -0.262*** -0.293*** -0.296*** -0.266*** -0.288*** -0.288*** -0.262*** -0.296*** -0.299*** 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041) (0.040) (0.037) (0.046) (0.047) 
Constant 1.330*** 0.824*** 0.682*** 1.369*** 1.088*** 1.105*** 1.321*** 1.026*** 0.940*** 
 (0.164) (0.218) (0.252) (0.179) (0.143) (0.220) (0.175) (0.217) (0.346) 
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.666 0.699 0.703 0.676 0.693 0.694 0.677 0.693 0.694 
Notes: Dependent variable: annualized long difference in log GDP/worker (2003–15). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Moreover, in Table 2 using long differences we find that the change in physical capital 
is never statistically significant, whereas in Tables A1 (Appendix) using short 
differences the physical capital variables turn significant. This suggests that there 
are limitations with these specifications, which will be addressed in the next section 
where we use dynamic panel techniques.  
In order to investigate the consequences of applying measures of human capital 
quality rather than quantity the same analysis is performed using student 
achievement scores on the PISA test as proxies for human capital. We differentiate 
between achievement scores in mathematics, reading and science tests. As mentioned 
earlier, the PISA test was collected tri-annually since 2003. There are two ways of 
applying the traditional model on our data. Firstly, we can take long differences over 
the periods between 2003 and 2015. Secondly, we can use linear interpolation to fill 
up the gaps between PISA observations and use the short differences method. In 
order to make different human capital measures comparable we use the same time 
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periods and the same group of PISA participating countries for the analysis9. The 
only drawback of choosing this time period is the difficulty in comparing our 
estimates with earlier results in the literature. 
Results in Table 3 show that when accounting for both channels of changes and initial 
level of human capital quality a similar picture emerges as earlier. The changes in 
PISA scores across all three disciplines are positive, however it only gets significant 
for mathematics scores (Column 3). Despite the sample of countries used are slightly 
different, the impact of the PISA human capital measure is substantially larger than 
either the BL, PWT or CS measures, however the effect is slightly weaker 
(statistically significant only at the 10% level). These results confirm to some extent 
previously reported findings in the literature regarding the importance of education 
quality for growth. For example, Hanushek and Woessmann (2012), using average 
standardised maths and science scores in international tests as a proxy for cognitive 
skills, find that differences in cognitive skills lead to economically significant 
differences in economic growth.  
                                                          
9 The countries included are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Macao, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Vietnam. 
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In Table A2 we perform the same regressions using short difference regressions 
however the coefficient on the changes in PISA mathematics scores is not weakly 
significant anymore. This suggests that the method of analysis has a large impact on 
findings.  
Table 3. Growth Regressions using PISA test scores HC measures 
  ____PISA Mathematics___ ______PISA Reading_____  ______PISA Science______ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
Δ lnh 0.398  0.937* 0.293  0.533 0.296  0.448 
 (0.287)  (0.542) (0.222)  (0.394) (0.333)  (0.560) 
Ln ht-1  -0.085 0.409  -0.108 0.201  -0.123 0.131 
  (0.146) (0.258)  (0.130) (0.224)  (0.174) (0.309) 
Δ lnk 0.027 0.058 -0.030 0.048 0.059 0.033 0.048 0.065 0.034 
 (0.119) (0.114) (0.131) (0.112) (0.112) (0.116) (0.117) (0.110) (0.121) 
Ln yt-1 -0.254*** -0.249*** -0.293*** -0.256*** -0.246*** -0.274*** -0.251*** -0.245*** -0.262*** 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.046) (0.035) (0.036) (0.043) (0.034) (0.037) (0.047) 
Constant 1.301*** 1.806** -1.053 1.301*** 1.928** 0.136 1.289*** 2.024* 0.524 
 (0.142) (0.873) (1.454) (0.154) (0.793) (1.296) (0.150) (1.048) (1.787) 
Observations 59 59 59 60 60 60 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.653 0.632 0.673 0.638 0.626 0.642 0.642 0.633 0.643 
Notes: Dependent variable: annualized long difference in log GDP/employed person (2003–15). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, in Table 4 we complement our discussion on human capital with regression 
estimates on the impact of educational inequality (as measured by educational GINI) 
on growth. The variable on changes in inequality is positive but insignificant, broadly 
the same magnitude as the BL and CS measures. This result is consistent with 
Foldvari and van Leeuwen (2011) who also find that the GINI coefficient of education 
yields an insignificant coefficient. However, as opposed to the previous two tables the 
variable on the initial level of inequality is negative and weakly significant 
suggesting that higher levels of inequality are related to smaller subsequent changes 
in GDP per employed person. In Table A3 we replicated the human capital inequality 
regressions using short difference estimates. Despite all our coefficients have the 
same sign, we do not overserve a significant effect of initial inequality in 2003. This 
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suggests again that the results are sensitive to the specification used to analyse the 
impact of human capital. 
Table 4. Growth Regressions using Education Inequality measures 
                  Educational Inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
Δ lnGini 0.136  0.166 
 (0.184)  (0.179) 
Ln Ginit-1  -0.078* -0.082* 
  (0.044) (0.045) 
Δ lnk 0.097 0.078 0.108 
 (0.101) (0.095) (0.101) 
Ln yt-1 -0.255*** -0.282*** -0.272*** 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.033) 
Constant 1.283*** 1.602*** 1.579*** 
 (0.133) (0.232) (0.218) 
Observations 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.658 0.673 0.679 
Notes: Dependent variable: annualized long difference in log 
GDP/worker (2003–15). Robust standard errors in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.2 Dynamic specification 
Although the analysis so far is theoretically sound it does not fully capture the 
dynamic effect of human capital on growth. This may also explain the lack of robust 
results. Therefore, we extend our econometric approach to complement our discussion 
on the different channels that may impact growth.  
The lack of observations in both cross sectional and time series dimensions make the 
analysis challenging in the second part of the study where we look at cross sectional 
dependence and heterogeneity in a dynamic panel setting. As such, in this section we 
only focus on the average schooling (BL, PWT, CS) and educational inequality 
measures, which allows us to broaden the number of participating countries and to 
extend the time period under analysis between 1960 and 2015 in our growth 
regressions.  
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Besides running the regressions using the full sample, due to the longer time 
dimension and a greater number of countries available, the data also allows us to 
create groups of countries at similar stages of economic development (e.g. OECD and 
Emerging Markets (EMs) from Asia, South America and Africa)10. This can help to 
alleviate the relevance of the heterogeneity problem. However, assuming the same 
returns to factor inputs even within these groups of countries is a strong assumption. 
The use of standard panel data techniques can only partially address this issue under 
the assumption that cross-country differences are fixed over time. A much more 
flexible estimation strategy is to allow the technology parameters to vary by 
estimating separate equations for each country and then derive the mean of 
individual estimates, as in the Mean Group (MG) estimator (Pesaran and 
Smith,1995; Pesaran et al. 1999; Bond and Eberhardt 2013). 
In addition, another issue is related to the assumption of cross-sectional 
independence. This means that in the empirical analysis each country (cross-
sectional unit) is treated as a separate entity with no impact on other countries’ 
technologies. So far this issue has been mainly neglected in the human capital 
literature, with a notable exception of Lenkei et al. (2018). However, this is a strong 
assumption given increasing interconnections across economies, common shock such 
as financial crises, globalisation and international spill-overs, including human 
capital spill-over and productivity spill-overs (Engelbrecht 1997). This is especially 
true when using panel dataset with long-time dimensions. This increases a possibility 
of bias in our coefficient estimates. Even if spill-overs are not present between 
                                                          
10 This distinction would support the view that human capital accumulation has differing impact on different 
nations depending on their level of development (Vandenbussche et al 2006). 
49 
 
countries, other unobserved common effects can be accounted for by controlling for 
cross-sectional dependence (Eberhardt et al., 2013).  
For the estimation of the dynamic model (Equation 6), we adopt the Pesaran et al. 
(1999) Pooled Mean Group estimator method. This allows short run coefficients and 
error variances to vary across countries, while imposing common long-run 
coefficients. This means that technology parameters will converge to common values 
in the long-run, while they differ in the short run, a reasonable assumption when 
countries have access to similar technologies. Imposing common long run coefficients 
increases the efficiency of the estimates and it is therefore preferred in this setting. 
This estimation framework also allows us to test directly for the presence of co-
integration, based on the significance of the error correction term (the speed of 
adjustment). To account for cross sectional dependence, we extend the PMG 
estimator to include the common factors in the specification of the short-run 
dynamics (Binder and Offermanns, 2014). 
In our study the adoption of the ARDL modelling framework will produce consistent 
estimates even in the presence of endogenous regressors, as discussed in Pesaran and 
Shin (1999). Another issue is related to cross sectional independence i.e. each cross-
section unit is treated as an isolated entity without impact on other countries’ 
technologies. Omitting factors that capture the effects of common shocks can make 
our estimates biased and inconsistent. By adding controls for cross-sectional 
dependence, we account for an additional source of omitted variable bias.  
In Table 5 we present the results of the estimation for the first differences model 
under the assumption of cross-sectional independence and exogeneous regressors 
between 1960 and 2015. The results provide mixed evidence. The three human capital 
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measures are negative but while the Cohen Soto measure is statistically significant, 
the Barro-Lee and PWT measures remain insignificant. We replicate the analysis in 
Table A4 restricting the samples to OECD and EMs, however we do not find any 
significant effect for any of the three human capital indicators in the two sub-
samples. The general lack of significant results is in line with our previous findings 
(Table 2) and other findings in the human capital literature (e.g. Benhabib and 
Spiegel 1994; Sunde and Vischer, 2015). Furthermore, negative results were also 
found in Pritchett (2001) using an ‘educational capital’ measure (based on Barro Lee 
data) between 1960 and 1987. He justifies the presence of this negative relationship 
with slow growth in the demand for educated labour and failed education systems 
that may provide few skills. 
  
                        Table 5. First Differences models: common technologies  
and cross-sectional independence (1960-2015) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Barro Lee Cohen Soto PWT 
        
Δlnkit 0.487*** 0.478*** 0.485*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.053) 
Δlnhit (Barro-Lee) -0.053   
 (0.092)   
Δlnhit (Cohen-Soto)  -0.012***  
  (0.004)  
Δlnhit (PWT)   -0.459 
   (0.348) 
Constant 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Observations 4,601 3,561 4,825 
R-squared 0.111 0.108 0.108 
Note: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log 
first differences. Estimation is based on a fixed effect 
estimator and all specifications include time and country 
dummies. Standard errors in brackets. * = significant at 
10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
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There are two important concerns with the results presented in Table 5. Firstly, the 
assumption of cross-sectional independence and secondly, the assumption that there 
are the same technology coefficients across all the countries. In Table A5 we re-
estimate the model by controlling for cross-sectional dependence using mean group 
estimator (Pesaran 2006). Similar to the models with cross sectional independence 
we obtain mixed results. However, the estimates in Table A5 are overall preferred 
compared to Table 5, because by controlling for CSD, we are possibly accounting for 
factors that can affect the impact of human capital, such as corruption, militarism, 
religious and political conflicts and other institutional factors.  
Next, we present our analysis based on a fully dynamic model, which provides an 
alternative way of modelling human capital stock and human capital accumulation. 
These models are more complex as they use the ECM framework, as discussed earlier, 
it allows us to capture the short and long run-impact of human capital on growth 
(Pesaran 2009). The estimator imposes the same long-run coefficient on the countries 
included in the regression but makes the short-run effects to be specific to each 
country. Results presented in Tables 6 are based on the PMG estimator (Pesaran et 
al. 1999), where Columns 1-3 present results based on the assumption of cross-
sectional independence, while in Columns 4-6 the correction for CSD is included in 
the short-run specification (Binder and Offermanns 2014).  
In all model specifications the error correction term is significant and has a negative 
sign as expected. This confirms the validity of the framework and the presence of a 
long-run equilibrium. On average, the EC term predicts a similar rate of adjustment 
across all models. It can be interpreted as each year our sample of countries will 
approximately close 10% of the gap between short-run and long run equilibrium. The 
growth in output per worker is positively and significantly related to the long-run 
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coefficients on human and physical capital. This is true for the BL, CS and PWT 
measures. The only insignificant results are the BL coefficients in the no CDS 
specification (Column 1).   
As both the long-run coefficients on physical capital per worker and the error 
correction term are statistically significant, it implies that the models presented in 
the previous sections suffer from the omitted variable bias. The changes in output 
per capita are positively related to changes in physical and human capital, suggesting 
that human and physical capital accumulation played an important role in 
supporting growth in our sample of countries in the long-run (short run coefficient on 
education are either negative or insignificant – or both)11.  
In Tables 4-6 the CS and PWT coefficients are larger compared to the BL measure of 
human capital. This suggests that controlling for the differential returns to education 
can considerably increase the role that human capital plays in growth models. This 
is consistent with other studies in the human capital literature (e.g. Mason et al., 
2012). 
We replicate the results in Appendix Table A6 and A7 using OECD and Emerging 
Market samples respectively. The findings are unchanged, suggesting that human 
capital investments have a broadly positive and significant effect on productivity in 
the long-run, but not in the short-run. There are some slight differences however 
between the two groups of countries. For instance, both the BL and CS estimates are 
smaller for OECD compared to emerging economies in the long-run, which suggest 
                                                          
11 A reason explaining the negative short-run impact is that initial growth inhuman capital can be 
costly for developing countries, however in the long run the rates of accumulation is expected to 
outweigh these effects. 
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that increasing average levels of education should be crucial in promoting growth in 
emerging economies.  
If we compare the results with related studies in the literature, we find that 
improving the model specification by accounting for cross-sectional dependence and 
heterogeneity we obtain stronger effects of human capital on economic growth in both 
in developed and developing economies as compared to previous studies (e.g. Mankiw 
et al. 1992; Collins and Bosworth 1996; Pritchett 2001; Baldacci et al. 2008; Park 
2012). For instance, the findings of Collins and Bosworth (1996) implies a range of 
values for the human capital variables between 0.16 and 0.25. Similarly, Baldacci et 
al. (2008) estimation for the human capital values is approximately 0.1. Our 
estimates are closer to the results of Sunde and Vischer's (2015) who estimated 
human capital coefficients between 0.3 and 0.6 for a sample of 90 countries, although 
the methods used in this study differ.  
Although direct comparison of the results of these studies is challenging given the 
differences in the composition of samples, it is clear from the results based on the 
dynamic model specification produces larger effects for human capital compared to 
estimates in previous studies. This implies that some studies in the past may have 
underestimated the importance education in promoting economic growth, whereas 
our study provides a stronger argument towards policies targeting increased 
investment in education. There are other factors that are also important in promoting 
economic growth including investments in research and development (Griffith et al. 
2004), product quality and variety (Funke and Strulik, 2000), and access to finance 
(Levine and Zervos, 1998); however, improvements in human capital is a prerequisite 
for achieving other targets.  
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Table 6. Pooled mean group estimator of the relationship between human capital and growth. All countries. (1960-2015) 
 No correction for CSD ARDL(1,1,1) Correction for CSD ARDL(1,1,1) Correction for CSD ARDL(2,2,2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
lnkit 0.656*** -0.554*** 0.298*** 0.618*** 0.386*** 0.476*** 0.606*** 0.325*** 0.640*** 
 (0.020) (0.125) (0.028) (0.024) (0.031) (0.022) (0.023) (0.034) (0.019) 
lnhit (Barro-Lee) -0.025   0.117***   0.177***   
 (0.023)   (0.036)   (0.031)   
lnhit (Cohen-Soto)  1.905***   0.269***   0.837***  
  (0.170)   (0.023)   (0.054)  
lnhit (PWT)   1.394***   1.075***   0.458*** 
   (0.079)   (0.071)   (0.062) 
EC -0.090*** -0.043*** -0.104*** -0.140*** -0.097*** -0.141*** -0.159*** -0.100*** -0.162*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Δlnkit 0.404*** 0.451*** 0.399*** 0.416*** 0.393*** 0.364*** 0.535*** 0.544*** 0.484*** 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.070) (0.064) (0.068) (0.071) (0.075) (0.096) (0.078) 
Δlnhit (Barro-Lee) -0.102   0.565   0.252   
 (0.546)   (0.430)   (0.427)   
Δlnhit (Cohen-Soto)  -0.552   -0.566*   0.673  
  (0.373)   (0.339)   (0.503)  
Δlnhit (PWT)   -2.631***   -1.492**   -1.314 
   (0.896)   (0.714)   (0.911) 
Constant 0.039*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.043*** 0.072*** 0.037 0.022 -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.028) (0.014) (0.012) (0.034) 
Observations 5,283 4,137 5,538 5,283 4,137 5,538 5,236 4,057 5,486 
Notes: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. EC stands for Error Correction coefficient. Specifications (4)–(9) are augmented 
with cross section averages (not reported). Standard errors in brackets. * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
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5.3 Educational Inequality in the Dynamic Model 
In this section we address the issue of whether large inequalities in human capital 
distribution within a nation plays an important role in growth. If the ability of a 
nation’s population is normally distributed, then a skewed distribution of educational 
opportunities will lead to welfare losses. As such, an equitable distribution of human 
capital constitutes a pre-requisite for substantial gains in productivity (Thomas et al. 
2002).  
For this analysis we apply the educational GINI coefficient by van Leeuwen and van 
Leeuwen-Li (2015), originally proposed by Thomas et al. (2002). Table 7 presents the 
results of the first differences regressions where columns (1)-(3) assume common 
technology and cross-sectional independence, while columns (4)-(6) assume common 
technology and cross-sectional dependence. Both GINI coefficients have the expected 
negative sign but remain insignificant. We re-run these regressions in Table 8 also 
controlling for the BL, PWT and CS measures of HC but the educational GINI 
coefficients are still non-significant with the same sign as without HC controls. In 
Table A8 using OECD and emerging market sub-samples the GINI coefficients are 
still non-significant, but their sign turn positive for OECD countries suggesting that 
inequality impacts EMs more negatively than developed markets.  
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Table 7. First differences model: Educational inequality 
as a determinant of growth (1960-2015) 
  (1) (2) 
  
Cross-sectional 
Independence 
Cross-sectional 
Dependence 
Δlnkit 0.458*** 0.374*** 
 -0.062 -0.062 
ΔlnGINIit -0.009 -0.173 
 -0.03 -0.187 
Constant 0.040*** -0.009 
  -0.015 -0.009 
Observations 4,242 4,242 
R-squared 0.107  
Number of id 101 101 
Note: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. Estimation is 
based on a fixed  effect estimator and all specifications include time and country dummies. 
Columns (1)-(3) assume common technologies and cross-sectional independence, while 
columns (4)-(5) assume common technologies and cross-sectional dependence. Standard 
errors in brackets * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
 
Table 8. First differences model: Educational inequality as a  
determinant of growth, controlling for HC measures (1960-2015) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Barro Lee Penn World Table Cohen Soto 
Δlnkit 0.475*** 0.473*** 0.489*** 
 (0.056) (0.054) (0.059) 
ΔlnGINIit -0.007 -0.008 -0.050 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.051) 
Δlnhit (Barro-Lee) -0.016   
 (0.092)   
Δlnhit (PWT)  -0.271  
  (0.448)  
Δlnhit (CS)   -0.013*** 
   (0.004) 
Constant 0.042** 0.042*** 0.042** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Observations 3,967 4,146 3,427 
R-squared 0.106 0.102 0.108 
Number of id 93 97 77 
Note: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. Assuming 
common technologies and cross-sectional dependence Estimation is based on a fixed 
effect estimator and all specifications include time and country dummies. Standard 
errors in brackets * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 
1%. 
 
In Table 9 we estimate the impact of educational inequality using the pooled mean 
group estimator method. The same long-run coefficients are imposed across our 
samples, but short-run adjustments are allowed to be country specific. The long-run 
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elasticity of the educational inequality GINI coefficients (lnGINIit) turn negative, 
while the short run impacts (ΔlnGINIit) are positive (except from Column 2). Using 
the coefficient in Column (3) we can interpret the long run coefficients as follows: if 
the long run average educational Gini were to increase 1% it would decrease changes 
in the long run GDP per worker by 1.2%. The regressions are replicated in Tables A9 
for OECD and emerging market samples. We observe generally larger coefficients for 
emerging economies suggesting that in these countries improvements in terms of 
education inequality leads to larger growth opportunities. It is important to note 
however that the results are sensitive to the dynamic specification.   
 
Table 9. PMGE: Educational inequality as a determinant of growth 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
No correction for 
CSD ARDL(1,1,1) 
Correction for 
CSD ARDL(1,1,1) 
Correction for 
CSD ARDL(2,2,2) 
lnkit 0.937*** 0.512*** 0.754*** 
 (0.101) (0.025) (0.029) 
lnGINIit -3.794*** -0.008 -1.278*** 
 (0.354) (0.042) (0.038) 
EC -0.034*** -0.091*** -0.094*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) 
Δlnkit 0.397*** 0.459*** 0.477*** 
 (0.066) (0.077) (0.088) 
ΔlnGINIit 0.463*** -0.113 0.192 
 (0.150) (0.199) (0.203) 
Constant 0.397*** 0.052*** 0.372*** 
 (0.074) (0.013) (0.055) 
Obs. 4,242 4,242 4,220 
Notes: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. EC stands 
for Error Correction coefficient. Specifications (4)–(9) are augmented with cross section 
averages (not reported). Standard errors in brackets. * = significant at 10%, ** = 
significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
The long run negative sign of the GINI coefficient on educational inequality hindering 
economic growth meets our prior expectations12. They highlight the importance of the 
                                                          
12 Nevertheless, some past studies obtained a negative relationship between equality in education 
and income per capita (e.g. Gille, 2015). 
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United Nations (UN) efforts to combat inequality in the word. The UN is currently 
calling for the adoption of what is known as the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDG), which is the successor to the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2005). One of the goals of the SDG is to set forth an 
intergovernmental framework that provides equitable and inclusive education for all 
and to reduce economic, political and social equality within nations. The results are 
consistent with the literature suggesting that it is more important to increase the 
supply of workers in the primary and secondary levels to improve productivity (Self 
and Grabowski 2004, Keller 2006), as opposed to other studies highlighting that the 
impact of completed higher education is a more important driver of economic 
prosperity compared to general accessibility to lower levels of schooling (Castello-
Climent and Mukhopadhyay 2013, Castello-Climent et al. 2017).  
 6. Conclusion 
In the last few decades the role of schooling has become a central part of most nations 
and some international organisations’ (e.g. UN, OECD) development strategies 
(Hanushek and Woessmann 2007). This study provides a discussion on the impact of 
the quantity and quality human capital and educational inequality on economic 
growth, with the main objective of bringing some resolution to the mixed evidence 
and shed light on some of the unresolved issues that still plague the macroeconomic 
literature. We use different measures of human capital and model specifications and 
present a range of econometric modelling techniques to capture the channels through 
which human capital can impact on growth. Firstly, using long differences estimators 
we do not find that changes in the average years of schooling between 2003 and 2015 
significantly affects growth by using either of the three HC measures (BL, PWT, CS). 
However, initial levels of HC do have an impact in a way that higher levels of initial 
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average years of schooling in 2003 significantly contributes to higher growth over the 
observed time period. We complement the discussion in the literature on the effects 
of human capital quantity versus quality when we re-run the same regressions 
controlling PISA scores capturing the effects of HC quality. Our results provide some 
evidence that quality, captured by PISA mathematics score, has a somewhat stronger 
impact as the magnitude of our quality coefficients are larger, although their effect is   
weakly significant. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the inequality of 
educational attainment using the long differences modelling framework. Access to 
education should be available for the whole population in most counties. If people's 
abilities are normally distributed, then a skewed distribution of educational 
opportunities represent welfare losses. Although we observe negative coefficients, 
they don’t turn significant at any of our modelling frameworks. This is an important 
issue that requires further investigation.  
Given some of the limitations of the long differences model the second part of the 
study makes use of new developments in panel data techniques. By controlling for 
the possible presence of cross-sectional heterogeneity and dependence between 
countries, our results suggest that in the last few decades, changes in human capital 
stock have played an important role in increasing productivity across countries. 
While the first differences model does not support the view that investments in 
education plays a significant role in raising growth in output, the ECM framework, 
our preferred model, predicts a statistically significant increase in output given a 1% 
increase in human capital. This is consistent across all three measures of human 
capital (BL, CS and PWT). In addition, we observe a larger magnitude for human 
capital coefficients in our sample of developing countries. This is consistent with 
previous findings in the HC literature (e.g. Lenkei et al 2018). We also find that in 
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the PMG framework the CS and PWT measures human capital measures are larger 
compared to the BL measure. This is because the CS and PWT adjust information on 
educational attainment with different returns for primary, secondary and tertiary 
education, therefore producing larger coefficients. This suggests that accounting for 
the quality of education gives an even stronger human capital effect. In addition, the 
dynamic panel data model finds significant evidence that in the long run a more equal 
distribution of education within societies (measured by educational GINI) leads to 
higher changes in income per worker.  
The findings from this analysis raise important questions for policymakers across the 
world. For instance, should countries focus resources on increasing the percentage of 
population accessing basic education or instead improving the educational 
circumstances for current students. It is a common objective for governments to 
expand access to education, especially at the basic level. But for any level of efficiency, 
in order to maintain quality, increased number of enrolments require increased 
resources. This is especially true for developing countries where increases in 
enrolments can be accompanied by worsening schooling conditions, lower public 
school spending and increasing student teacher ratios. 
Overall, the study provides evidence that, over the last few decades, human capital 
has had an impact on economic growth. This is particularly true when using dynamic 
specification and controlling for cross-sectional heterogeneity and unknown common 
factors. Our results support the view that governmental policies should focus on 
allocating national resources to education improving both accessibility to basic 
education in all parts of the society while at the same time improving the quality of 
education systems.  
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In addition, further analysis is required to investigate if our results hold for different 
sub-sub-samples of countries (e.g. by regions). This is necessary as different 
environmental factors and the quality of education systems can differ across 
countries, implying differential effects of human capital. Moreover, the overall 
economic institutions also have an impact on growth. For instance, the security of the 
nation, the openness of the economy, a well-defined system of property rights can be 
considered almost as prerequisites to economic growth. Without these efficiencies, 
skills and education may not have the desired impact on economic development and 
we cannot presume that any spending is a productive investment. These factors all 
have implications for policy interventions that should consider countries’ specific 
needs.  
Another area worth exploring in further studies is the differential impact of primary, 
secondary and tertiary education on growth (Lenkei et al 2018). This would be able 
to further address the issue whether policies should be directed towards increasing 
investments in primary and secondary education or focusing on a minority educated 
at the tertiary level. A further extension to macro growth models is the potential 
incorporation of non-cognitive. Non-cognitive skills are a broad category of metrics 
encompassing personality, behaviours and socio-emotional skills (Lundberg 2015). 
However, one of the shortcoming of these measures is that they are difficult to find 
for a large number of countries.   
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Appendix 1  
Working out of Equation 3: 
Equation 2 is is given by the following formula:  
lnyit = μit + δ10i lnkit + δ11i lnkit-1 + 𝛾10i lnhit + 𝛾11i lnhit-1 + λlnyit-1 + εit          
If we take out lnyit-1 from both sides we obtain: 
Δlnyit = lnyit - lnyit-1 = μit + δ10i lnkit + δ11i lnkit-1 + 𝛾10i lnhit + 𝛾11i lnhit-1 + λlnyit-1 - 
lnyit-1  + εit     
which can be re-written as: 
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Δlnyit = lnyit - lnyit-1 = μit + δ10i lnkit + δ11i lnkit-1 + 𝛾10i lnhit + 𝛾11i lnhit-1 – (1– λ)lnyit-1 
+ εit   
Next we both add and subtract δ10i lnkit-1 and 𝛾10i lnhit-1 from both sides of the 
equation to get: 
Δlnyit = μit + δ10i lnkit - δ10i lnkit-1 + δ10i lnkit-1 + δ11i lnkit-1 + 𝛾10i lnhit - 𝛾10i lnhit-1 + 𝛾10i 
lnhit-1 + 𝛾11i lnhit-1 – (1– λ)lnyit-1 + εit   
Simplifying: 
Δlnyit = μit + δ10i Δ lnkit + δ10i lnkit-1 + δ11i lnkit-1 + 𝛾10i Δ lnhit + 𝛾10i lnhit-1 + 𝛾11i lnhit-1 – 
(1– λ)lnyit-1 + εit   
Δlnyit = μit + δ10i Δ lnkit + 𝛾10i Δ lnhit + δ10i lnkit-1 + δ11i lnkit-1 + 𝛾10i lnhit-1 + 𝛾11i lnhit-1 – 
(1– λ)lnyit-1 + εit   
Simplifying we get:  
Δlnyit = ϕi (lnyit-1 - θ0i - θ1i lnkit-1 - θ2i lnhit-1) + δ10iΔlnkit + δ20iΔlnhit + εit                            
 
Appendix 2 
Construction of educational GINI coefficient 
Below we include a brief description on how the educational Gini by van Leowen et 
al (2013) is calculated. They use the methods suggested by Thomas, Wang, and Fan 
(2002), Castello and Doménech (2002) and Checchi (2004). In order to convert the 
educational information in educational Ginis they start with  
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Where H is average years of schooling in the population aged 15 years and over, i and 
j are different levels of education, in  and jn  are the attainment per level of education, 
and ixˆ  and jxˆ  are the cumulative average years of schooling at each educational 
level. This equation can be rewritten as follows: 
   
   321321211
21333221
0
xxxnxxnxn
nnxnnnxn
nG h


   
Where 𝑥 stands for the average years of schooling per level of education (0= no 
education, 1= primary education, 2 = secondary education, and 3 is higher education) 
divided by the percentage population with at least that level of education attained.  
0n , 1n , 2n , and 3n  are the percentages of the  population  with no-, primary-, 
secondary-, and higher education respectively. This equation gives the possibility to 
calculate the educational Gini for every year and country. 
Appendix 3  
Changes and initial levels of in human capital 
Figure A1-6. Relationship between changes and initial levels of in human capital 
 Fig.A1                                                                       Fig.A2 
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     Fig.A3.                                                                      Fig.A4. 
    
    FigA5.                                                                        FigA6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7. Relationship between change in GDP per worker 
 and avg. educational inequality 
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Appendix 4  
Table A1. Growth Regressions using average schooling HC measures (short differences) 
  _____Barro and Lee____ ____Penn World Table__ ____Cohen and Soto___ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Δ lnh -0.041  0.075 -0.555  -0.553 0.074  0.341 
 (0.220)  (0.192) (0.456)  (0.453) (0.465)  (0.573) 
Ln ht-1  0.013 0.015  0.014 0.000  0.010 0.020 
  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.022) (0.022)  (0.013) (0.015) 
Δ lnk 0.268** 0.266** 0.267** 0.269** 0.268** 0.269** 0.094 0.092 0.092 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.110) (0.111) (0.110) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) 
Ln yt-1 -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.100*** 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.106*** 0.091*** 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.097*** 0.077** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.027) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022) (0.031) 
Observations 649 649 649 649 649 649 451 451 451 
R-squared 0.119 0.120 0.120 0.123 0.120 0.123 0.108 0.109 0.111 
Notes: Dependent variable: annualized short differences in log GDP/worker (2003–15). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Growth Regressions using PISA test scores HC measures (short differences) 
 ____PISA Mathematics___ ______PISA Reading_____ ______PISA Science______ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Δ lnh 0.283  0.223 0.289  0.248 0.182  0.022 
 (0.358)  (0.390) (0.276)  (0.271) (0.269)  (0.316) 
Ln ht-1  -0.016 -0.006  -0.018 -0.006  -0.020 -0.019 
  (0.028) (0.033)  (0.029) (0.032)  (0.028) (0.035) 
Δ lnk 0.271** 0.272** 0.271** 0.275** 0.278** 0.276** 0.268** 0.274** 0.273** 
 (0.112) (0.111) (0.113) (0.109) (0.108) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.115) 
Ln yt-1 
-
0.019*** 
-0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 0.097*** 0.192 0.133 0.097*** 0.202 0.131 0.098*** 0.215 0.209 
 (0.018) (0.153) (0.180) (0.016) (0.161) (0.177) (0.017) (0.156) (0.193) 
Observations 649 649 649 660 660 660 649 649 649 
R-squared 0.121 0.121 0.122 0.123 0.121 0.123 0.120 0.121 0.121 
Notes: Dependent variable: annualized short differences in log GDP/worker (2003–15). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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    Table A3. Growth Regressions using Education Inequality measures 
          _Educational Inequality_____ 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
Δ lnh 0.046  0.045 
 (0.080)  (0.080) 
Ln ht-1  -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Δ lnk 0.088 0.088 0.089 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Ln yt-1 -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.109*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) 
Observations 528 528 528 
R-squared 0.111 0.112 0.113 
  Notes: Dependent variable: annualized short differences in log GDP/worker (2003–15).  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4. First Differences models: common technologies  
and cross-sectional independence (1960-2015) 
 _________OECD_________ _____Emerging Economies__ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Δlnkit 0.198*** 0.219*** 0.193*** 0.546*** 0.519*** 0.529*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.065) (0.058) 
Δlnhit (Barro-Lee) -0.145   0.069   
 (0.164)   (0.083)   
Δlnhit (Cohen-Soto)  0.339   -0.007  
  (0.364)   (0.004)  
Δlnhit (PWT)   -1.021   0.067 
   (0.759)   (0.600) 
Constant 0.002 
-
0.017*** 
0.010 0.035*** 0.004 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) 
Observations 1,468 1,169 1,468 1,888 1,858 2,112 
R-squared 0.177 0.226 0.183 0.167 0.145 0.138 
Note: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. Estimation is based on a 
fixed effect estimator and all specifications include time and country dummies. Standard errors in 
brackets. * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
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Table A5. First Differences model: heterogeneous technologies 
and cross-sectional dependence (1960-2015). 
 _____All countries_____ ________OECD______ ___Emerging Countries__ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Δlnkit 0.417*** 0.406*** 0.410*** 0.159** 0.210*** 0.157** 0.496*** 0.420*** 0.441*** 
 (0.059) (0.051) (0.055) (0.074) (0.078) (0.072) (0.060) (0.072) (0.071) 
Δlnhit (Barro-Lee) 0.278   0.434   0.060   
 (0.385)   (0.489)   (0.243)   
Δlnhit (Cohen-Soto)  0.382   -0.327   -0.304  
  (0.327)   (0.668)   (0.247)  
Δlnhit (PWT)   -0.095   0.046   -0.247 
   (0.618)   (0.741)   (0.595) 
Constant 0.043*** -0.006 0.060** 0.010 -0.001 0.035 0.005 0.001 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.026) (0.015) (0.005) (0.026) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Observations 5,283 4,137 5,538 1,713 1,368 1,713 2,244 2,168 2,499 
Note: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. All specifications are 
augmented with cross-section averages (not reported). Standard errors in brackets. * = significant at 
10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
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Table A6. Pooled mean group estimator of the relationship between human capital and growth. OECD countries. (1960-2015) 
 No correction for CSD ARDL(1,1,1) _Correction for CSD ARDL(1,1,1)_ _Correction for CSD ARDL(2,2,2)_ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
lnkit 0.712*** 0.181** 0.343*** 0.665*** 0.197** 0.626*** 0.540*** 0.240*** 0.556*** 
 (0.048) (0.092) (0.062) (0.040) (0.080) (0.053) (0.043) (0.086) (0.052) 
lnhit (Barro-Lee) -0.084   0.090   0.256***   
 (0.098)   (0.085)   (0.083)   
lnhit (Cohen-Soto)  1.353***   1.466***   1.216***  
  (0.267)   (0.226)   (0.217)  
lnhit (PWT)   1.237***   0.623***   0.791*** 
   (0.199)   (0.195)   (0.182) 
EC -0.099*** -0.082*** -0.103*** -0.143*** -0.111*** -0.150*** -0.130*** -0.115*** -0.139*** 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) 
Δlnkit 0.011 0.153* 0.027 0.056 0.179** 0.042 0.136 0.209** 0.105 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.096) (0.084) (0.084) (0.082) (0.083) (0.091) (0.077) 
Δlnhit (Barro-Lee) -0.392   0.244   -0.035   
 (0.396)   (0.488)   (0.383)   
Δlnhit (Cohen-Soto)  0.206   -0.026   0.121  
  (0.644)   (0.909)   (1.011)  
Δlnhit (PWT)   -0.185   0.616   1.355 
   (0.934)   (1.033)   (1.266) 
Constant 0.056*** 0.008 0.107*** 0.072*** -0.042*** 0.031 0.101*** 0.002 0.070*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.025) (0.019) (0.011) (0.026) 
Observations 1,713 1,368 1,713 1,713 1,368 1,713 1,706 1,342 1,706 
Notes: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. EC stands for Error Correction coefficient. Specifications (4)–(9) are augmented 
with cross section averages (not reported). Standard errors in brackets. * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
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Table A7. Pooled mean group estimator of the relationship between human capital and growth. Emerging Economies. (1960-2015) 
 No correction for CSD ARDL(1,1,1) _Correction for CSD ARDL(1,1,1)_ _Correction for CSD ARDL(2,2,2)_ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
lnkit 0.637*** 0.662*** 0.351*** 0.558*** 0.699*** 0.566*** 0.598*** 0.753*** 0.630*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.040) (0.040) (0.028) (0.026) (0.038) (0.025) (0.024) 
lnhit (Barro-Lee) 0.218***   0.208***   0.252***   
 (0.033)   (0.042)   (0.038)   
lnhit (Cohen-Soto)  0.262***   0.250***   0.266***  
  (0.026)   (0.023)   (0.023)  
lnhit (PWT)   1.321***   0.532***   0.417*** 
   (0.100)   (0.082)   (0.069) 
EC -0.092*** -0.094*** -0.101*** -0.143*** -0.119*** -0.152*** -0.159*** -0.130*** -0.169*** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) 
Δlnkit 0.544*** 0.388*** 0.469*** 0.508*** 0.384*** 0.436*** 0.654*** 0.677*** 0.608*** 
 (0.071) (0.086) (0.111) (0.077) (0.109) (0.103) (0.104) (0.148) (0.121) 
Δlnhit (Barro-Lee) -0.107   -0.031   -0.077   
 (0.218)   (0.313)   (0.303)   
Δlnhit (Cohen-Soto)  -0.289   0.062   0.269  
  (0.278)   (0.314)   (0.567)  
Δlnhit (PWT)   -2.107**   -1.136*   -0.720 
   (0.933)   (0.672)   (0.965) 
Constant -0.002 -0.020* 0.055*** 0.002 -0.079*** -0.051*** -0.036** -0.121*** -0.091*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) 
Observations 2,244 2,168 2,499 2,244 2,168 2,499 2,229 2,126 2,479 
Notes: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. EC stands for Error Correction coefficient. Specifications (4)–(9) are augmented 
with cross section averages (not reported). Standard errors in brackets. * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
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Table A8. First differences model: Educational inequality as a determinant of growth (1960-
2015) 
  Cross-sectional Independence Cross-sectional Dependence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OECD Emerging OECD Emerging 
Δlnkit 0.239*** 0.548*** 0.207*** 0.434*** 
 -0.051 -0.065 -0.066 -0.081 
ΔlnGINIit 0.042 -0.005 0.054 0.032 
 -0.065 -0.093 -0.099 -0.193 
Constant -0.010* 0.006 0.002 -0.003 
  -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.01 
Observations 1,351 1,888 1,351 1,888 
R-squared 0.225 0.154   
Number of id 31 42 31 42 
Note: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. Estimation is based on a fixed effect 
estimator and all specifications include time and country dummies. Columns (1)-(3) assume common technologies 
and cross-sectional independence, while columns (4)-(5) assume common technologies and cross-sectional 
dependence. Standard errors in brackets * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
 
Table A9. First differences model: Educational inequality as a  
determinant of growth, controlling for HC measures (1960-2015) 
 _________________OECD_______________ ____________Emerging Countries_________ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Barro Lee Penn World Table Cohen Soto Barro Lee 
Penn World 
Table 
Cohen Soto 
       
Δlnkit 0.239*** 0.236*** 0.219*** 0.566*** 0.548*** 0.542*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.058) (0.067) (0.065) (0.070) 
ΔlnGINIit 0.043 0.032 -0.038 -0.026 -0.003 -0.023 
 (0.065) (0.054) (0.042) (0.072) (0.111) (0.091) 
Δlnhit (Barro-Lee) -0.089   0.048   
 (0.159)   (0.081)   
Δlnhit (PWT)  -0.951   0.049  
  (1.250)   (0.700)  
Δlnhit (CS)   0.327   -0.007 
   (0.353)   (0.004) 
Constant -0.009 -0.001 -0.017*** -0.003 0.005 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
Observations 1,351 1,351 1,169 1,709 1,888 1,724 
R-squared 0.181 0.185 0.227 0.170 0.141 0.145 
Number of id 31 31 26 38 42 39 
Note: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. Assuming common technologies and 
cross-sectional dependence Estimation is based on a fixed effect estimator and all specifications include time and 
country dummies. Standard errors in brackets * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
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Table A10. PMGE: Educational inequality as a determinant of growth 
  
No correction for CSD 
ARDL(1,1,1) 
Correction for CSD 
ARDL(1,1,1) 
Correction for CSD 
ARDL(2,2,2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OECD 
Emerging 
Countries 
OECD 
Emerging 
Countries 
OECD 
Emerging 
Countries 
       
lnkit 0.578*** 0.163** 0.597*** 0.476*** 0.567*** 1.241*** 
 (0.043) (0.065) (0.056) (0.045) (0.058) (0.046) 
lnGINIit -0.316*** -0.358*** -0.06 0.018 -0.043 -0.135*** 
 (0.033) (0.091) (0.065) (0.065) (0.069) (0.044) 
EC -0.090*** -0.079*** 
-
0.086*** 
-0.105*** -0.103*** -0.100*** 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.017) 
Δlnkit 0.070 0.594*** 0.125* 0.571*** 0.105 0.671*** 
 (0.072) (0.104) (0.069) (0.115) (0.073) (0.127) 
ΔlnGINIit 0.271** 0.465 0.182 0.103 0.198 0.303 
 (0.107) (0.358) (0.121) (0.280) (0.122) (0.278) 
Constant 0.177*** 0.227*** 0.098*** 0.023* 0.116*** -0.150*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.022) (0.012) (0.025) (0.028) 
Obs. 1,351 1,888 1,351 1,888 1,351 1,888 
Notes: Dependent variable: value added per worker in log first differences. EC stands for Error Correction 
coefficient. Specifications (4)–(9) are augmented with cross section averages (not reported). Standard errors in 
brackets. * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. 
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Chapter 2.   
Time and risk preferences on parental 
educational expectations: Evidence from a 
developing country 
 
Education in developing countries is hypothesised to be a risky investment for 
households, while returns are only realised after some time in the future. In this study 
we use data from a field experiment to analyse the relationship between parental 
expectations on children education attainment and parental risk and time preferences 
among rural households in Peru. After controlling for a set of household, parental and 
child characteristics, we find that our risk-aversion parameter is significantly and 
positively related to expectations on schooling choices. This reveals that our sample of 
mothers does not consider education as a risky investment in rural Peru. Instead, they 
perceive education as a safe option and fear of losing out on higher returns resulting 
from high educational attainment. Moreover, a higher degree of impatience (higher 
discount rate) among mothers is significantly correlated with low expectations on 
children’s educational choices. This suggests that parents with high discount rates are 
expecting immediate financial gains from educational attainment of their children and 
therefore they may tend to underinvest in human capital given they are not patient 
enough to wait for its return.  
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1. Introduction 
Despite some recent advancement in providing basic education to children in developing 
countries, 57 million children are still out of school, including 20 million in Latin-
America (Unesco 2015). Among many determinants of children educational attainment 
are parental expectations about their children’s educational outcomes. The role of 
parental expectations for children education has received considerable attention in the 
economics, sociology, psychology and education literature in the past decades (Seginer 
1983, Goyette and Xie 1999, Glick and White 2004, Davis-Kean 2005, Yamamoto and 
Holloway 2010, Attanasio and Kaufmann 2015).  
 
Parental expectations on education have substantial economic and social impact on the 
household. High expectations of parents lead children to set higher standards for their 
education and to make greater demands on themselves from an early age which in turn 
results in high achievement, better attendance and more positive attitudes towards 
school (Boocock 1972, Astone and McLanahan, 1991, Peng and Wright 1994, Reynolds 
1998, Davis-Kean 2005, Yamamoto and Holloway 2010). At the same time low parental 
educational expectations can be transmitted through generations and they may create 
a vicious circle and reinforce poverty. In consequence, low parental educational 
expectations may reduce future academic achievement and successful labour market 
outcomes for children.  
 
Past evidence in the literature shows that higher expectations translate into better 
academic performance and higher achieved education level (Goyette and Xie 1999, 
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Englund et al 2004). This improved educational attainment will in turn significantly 
improve adult labour (Caspi et al 1998) and marriage (Ermisch et al 2006) market 
prospects and outcomes. Therefore, it is essential to include expectations in behavioural 
models that form the basis of policy decisions.  
 
Parents form expectations13 about future educational outcomes at early stages of their 
children’s life (Froiland et al. 2013). Heterogeneity in educational expectations is 
reflected in variations of educational investments, whereas the probability of investment 
increases with higher expected educational returns. In turn, the heterogeneity of 
expectations reflects individual preferences. In this study we explore how parents’ 
expectations vary with different levels of preferences for risk and time.  
 
In particular, we propose that parents’ expected utility derived from a child’s expected 
level of education is a decreasing function of the riskiness of the investment and parental 
risk aversion14. Thus, more risk averse parents would require greater expected returns 
                                                          
13 Some of the determinants that affect the formation of educational expectations include 
perceived returns to education and the availability of employment opportunities, observed 
outcomes for siblings, cultural beliefs about the connection between effort and educational 
success, perceived quality of education system and parental beliefs and biases.     
14 We define parental utility function using the following equation: E[U(Educ)] = E(REduc) − 
𝟏
𝟐
 Aσ2    
where, E[U(Educ)] is the expected parental utility derived from the child’s expected education, 
E(REduc) is the expected return for a given level of expected education, σ2 is the variance of the 
investment (risk) and A is the measure of risk aversion.  
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to education for accepting additional risk. The literature on educational investments 
considers the role of risk as a result of their uncertain returns, non-marketability and 
difficulty to diversify accumulated human capital (Becker 1962; Levhari and Weiss 1974; 
Paroush 1976). In developing countries, the risks of educational investments not 
achieving the desired outcomes are often magnified due to poor schooling environments 
and uncertain qualities of public education (Glewwe and Kremer 2006), inadequate 
living conditions and lack of resources within the household, dangerous neighbourhoods 
and security issues (Tanaka and Yamano 2015). All these factors make educational 
investments risky choices for poor households (e.g. Glewwe and Kremer 2006; Sawada 
and Lokshin 2009), which can consequently shape expectations. In addition, reliance on 
agricultural or small family business income often results in children dropping out from 
schools15 (Carneiro and Heckman 2002), meaning that those investments in the child 
will be sunk costs. Therefore, we claim overall that if education is perceived as a risky 
investment, the more risk averse the parents are, the lower expectations they will have 
about their children’s future educational attainment.  
 
In addition, education requires long-term commitment and years of investment are 
required before the returns can be realised (Becker 1964). In developing countries 
financial constraints can make people focus on problems in the present and neglect 
others in the future. Investing in the child’s education can be problematic given the 
scarcity of resources now, compared to returns to education in the future (Mullainathan 
                                                          
15 Children are further exposed to risks of unsupportive family environment such as parental 
neglect, harsh parenting, lack of stimulation at home or parental psychological distress. 
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and Shafir 2013). Since the opportunity cost of having children at school is so high, 
poverty regularly forces households to keep their children away from schools (Jensen 
and Nielsen, 1997). This is especially true for female students from less wealthy 
households who may have better immediate financial opportunities available through 
marriage. Low level of attainment is even more likely to happen if one of the parents 
becomes unfit to work. Since education may span over a long time period, parental 
patience and time preferences (the way parents discount future gains) are also 
contributing factors for the formation of schooling expectations.  
 
If risk and time preferences are omitted as explanatory variables from the estimation of 
parental expectation models, the estimation results can be biased if these preferences 
are correlated with some other determinants (Dohmen et al 2010). While past studies 
analysed the role of risk and time preferences of parents in determining parental 
investments both in developed countries (e.g. Germany, Wölfel and Heineck (2012)) and 
developing countries (e.g. Uganda, Tanaka and Yamano (2015)), to the best of the 
author’s knowledge no study has estimated the association between risk and time 
preferences of parents and parental expectations for the children in low income 
countries. This study is also different from previous papers in this field in the sense that 
there are no observations of actual parental behaviour but predictions under uncertainty 
about future children outcomes. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model showing the 
relationship between parental expectation and preferences. Section 3 discusses the 
sample used. Section 4 provides background information on the education sector in Peru. 
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Section 5 discusses our framework for measuring risk and time preferences and section 
6 present the experimental design. Section 7 describes the empirical model used. 
Sections 8 and 9 present the descriptive statistics and results while Section 10 concludes.  
 
2. Education in Peru 
In order to argue whether parents consider education as a risky investment or not, we 
also need to understand the education system in Peru. In 1996, the government passed 
education reforms that extended free and compulsory school education to all students 
aged between 6 and 16 (primary and secondary). However, secondary school is somewhat 
aspirational as approximately one quarter of the relevant age group does not currently 
enrol in upper secondary education (UNESCO, 2013). This is especially the case in 
remote parts of the Andean Highlands and across the sparsely populated Amazonian 
rainforest in the country’s interior. While public education is free, private schools 
operate at all levels of the education system. Schools in both public and private sectors 
follow the national curriculum, managed at the federal level and overseen by local 
education authorities, as mandated in a 2008 ministerial decree.  
 
Education in Peru has been expanding. Since 2005, enrolment has increased to 72% for 
ages 3 to 5 years old; the 6 to 11-year-old age group is at 97% and the 12 to 16-year-old 
age group is at 91% enrolment. However, educational data tells us that 34% of children 
ages 5 to 17 are in the labour force.  
Data from the National Institute of Statistics shows that since 1994, spending on 
education has quadrupled. However, Peru still only spends 3.9% of the gross domestic 
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product on education, which is among the lowest in the world16. Going, forward, one of 
the main reasons why Peru is considering to spend more on education in the next years 
is the lack of quality of schools and lack of infrastructure. In 2009, the Program of 
International Student Assessment ranked Peru near the bottom of the 65 participating 
countries for reading comprehension and science, while being second to last in math. For 
children 7 years of age, only 13% reached required math levels and only 30% reached 
required reading levels. This highlights that spending money is not enough by itself as 
it should be spent in more productive ways.  
The situation is more severe in rural areas. There may be various other reasons for drop-
outs besides financial constraints including long distance from home to school, early 
pregnancies and lack of aspirations and interest. The lack of interest can be also 
attributed to overcrowding, teacher absence or other poor schools quality issues often 
found in rural public schools that add to the uncertainties on the returns to education 
and impose additional perceived costs on parents.  
Vocational education is available from a variety of technological institutions; however it 
is mainly private. Higher education is available from both private and public 
universities. Since 2003, the number of students at private universities has doubled and 
in public universities it has increased by 12%. This substantial increase in private 
education shows that the more privileged students are gaining access to higher 
education. As public university is not completely free, it is harder for those without 
                                                          
16 In 2015, in terms of % of GDP spend on education Peru ranked below other South and Central 
American nations including Brazil (6.2%), Mexico (5.2%) and Colombia (4.5%). 
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money to access it. This makes sense considering Peru has one of the highest income 
inequalities in the world. 
On the surface, it seems as though education in Peru has somewhat improved over the 
last decade as literacy and enrolment rates are up as well as educational spending. 
However, the quality and access to education shows a different picture17. Therefore, 
increasing spending on education is a must, however investment in education needs to 
be conducted efficiently, considering how parents make educational decisions in low 
income households.   
 
3. Framework for measuring risk and time preferences 
Understanding how mothers in rural Peru form expectations should play a central role 
for policy-makers as individuals are likely to act upon them and they can become self-
fulfilling (Armantier et al., 2012; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012). For instance, 
mothers with low educational expectations are less likely to invest in their child’s 
schooling because it is in line with their beliefs. If low expectations are associated with 
certain individual preferences (e.g. risk and time), they may lead to worse realised 
outcomes.  
 
 
                                                          
17 In the 2012 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test Peru ranked the worst out 
of 65 countries that participated in the programme. In the 2015 version it’s position has slightly 
improved by coming 63rd out of the 69 countries taking part.   
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Risk preferences 
We make use of the expected utility theory to explain how risk preferences may matter 
for expectations. It states that a rational individual maximizes the expected utility of 
wealth or ∑ pi ∗ u(Wi) where u(Wi) is the level of utility derived from wealth Wi which 
occurs with probability pi for each of the n possible states. When the utility function is 
concave, the individual is said to be risk averse, preferring a sure income of Wi to a fair 
gamble with expected value of Wi. Using the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, 
r(W)=
−u’’(W)
u’(W)
, the risk averse individual is represented by r(W)>0, the risk loving 
individual by r(W)<0 and the risk neutral individual by r(W)=0. In risk experiments, the 
relative risk aversion parameter, r(M)=
− M∗u’’(M)
u’(M)
, is often estimated to represent the 
degree of risk aversion, where M is the change in wealth offered in the experiment 
instead of the final wealth (Holt and Laury, 2002). Assuming a constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility function, u(M) = 
𝑀1−σ
1−σ
, where σ indicates the curvature of the 
utility function and represents the risk attitude of individuals. A σ equal to 0 implies a 
risk neutral individual, a positive σ a risk averse, while a negative σ a risk lover person.  
 
If parents expect rates of return to be so high that they get more than compensated for 
the riskiness of the investment they will have higher expectations and allocate more 
resources to education. We expect that the more risk averse parents are, the less 
investment is allocated to education if education is perceived as a risky choice. However, 
it is proposed that risk aversion has different impact on educational expectations that 
on actual observed investment behaviour. If parents perceive schooling as a safe 
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investment that provides higher returns than any other alternatives, then the more risk 
adverse parents will have higher expectations for their children.   
 
Time preferences 
Present bias is the notion that individuals weight the utility from the present 
consumption higher than the utilities derived from consumptions at future dates, while 
the subjective discount rate is the rate at which individuals substitute future 
consumption with today’s consumption. In an experimental setting, they are measured 
by comparing the pair-wise choice of money at two different times. The value function is 
V(M0)= 
1
(1+r)t
 * V(Mt) where M0 is the present value for the individual facing the payoff 
Mt offered at time t  with r discount rate.  
 
Our prior expectations suggest that the higher parental impatience (higher discount 
rate) is negatively correlated with high educational expectations for their children.  This 
is because parents high discount rates expect immediate returns from education and 
likely to underinvest as they are not patient enough to wait for the returns.  
 
4. Sample and Data 
We analyse the relationship between parental expectations and risk/ time preferences 
using data obtained from rural households in Piura, North-Western Peru. Collection of 
the data took place between May and June 2016 as part of a field experiment to 
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encourage mobile banking take-up among rural communities. Although Peru’s economy 
has been growing rapidly in recent years, inequality still persists within the society. 
Between 2007 and 2012 poverty rates have dropped by around 16%, however, a quarter 
of the population still lives in economic hardship. The ratio of people living in poverty is 
even worse when comparing rural and urban areas (INEI Peru, 2013). The study was 
conducted by local consultancy firm Videnza and participants were all beneficiaries of 
JUNTOS (“together”) conditional cash transfer programme. JUNTOS was launched in 
2005 with two main aims: a) in the short run: providing households cash transfers thus 
reducing poverty and b) in the long run: reduce inter-generational transmission of 
poverty by investing in human capital (Perova and Vakis 2009). In order to receive a 
monthly lump sum cash payment of S./100 (soles)18 beneficiaries need to comply with a 
number of requirements (Table 1).  
Table 1. JUNTOS Conditions 
For children under 5 years: Attend regular health and nutrition controls 
(for periodic monitoring of height and weight, 
complete series of vaccinations, iron and 
Vitamin A supplements and anti-parasite 
checks) 
For children 6-14 years with 
incomplete primary school: 
School attendance at least 85% of the school 
year 
For pregnant and breast-feeding 
mothers: 
Attend prenatal and post-natal checks 
(tetanus vaccination, folic acid and iron 
supplements and anti-parasite checks) 
Source: Perova and Vakis (2009) 
                                                          
18 The median household income across Peru is S./720 monthly ($216).  
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As Table 1 shows all participants of the ‘JUNTOS’ program are required to send children 
to school between the ages of 6 and 14 at least 85% of the school year. If beneficiary 
mothers do not meet these requirements they risk losing out on higher potential income 
sources.  
In total, survey data was collected on 1,918 households including 6,757 children. In every 
household survey the person filling out the questionnaire was the beneficiary mother. 
We focus our analysis on children aged 14 or below (N=4283) since educational 
expectations about maximum levels of education can be affected by actual observed 
outcomes at later stages of the child’s schooling (e.g. end of secondary education). As 
such, we exclude adolescents from the analysis (Munro and Tanaka 2014). 
 
5. Data Collection of risk aversion and time preferences 
The experimental design follows that of the pairwise choice framework (Holt and Laury, 
2002). Subjects were asked to complete five decision tasks. The choice options for the 
four time preference tasks and one risk task are presented in Appendix (Figures 1-5).  
For each of the four time preferences tasks subjects had to make 11 decisions, choosing 
between Option 1 and Option 2. The only difference between the tasks was the timing of 
the pay-offs. Table 1 presents the pay-off timings across the four time preferences tasks.  
Table 1. Tasks 1-4. payoff timings 
  Option 1 Option 2 
Task 1  Tomorrow day after tomorrow 
Task 2 6 months 6 months and one day 
Task 3 Tomorrow 6 months 
Task 4 6 months 12 months 
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Once a subject choose Option 2 in any row, the task stops and then they automatically 
moved on to the next task. The purpose of these tasks is to identify the point at which 
the participant’s preference changes from Option 1 to 2 which is indicator of the subject’s 
discount rate. The discount rate is a parameter in an individual’s utility function 
capturing the trade-off between the consumption at an earlier and a later date. A high 
discount rate represents a high degree of impatience, while the opposite is true for 
patient parents. For example, at Task 1 if a subject switches from Option 1 to 2 in row 
5, then his or her time preference is represented by 100 ≤  
140
1+𝑟
  or r  ≤ 0.4.  
If individuals switched in the first row they were coded with the lowest discount rate (r) 
parameter 0, while subjects that never choose Option 2 (i.e. the highest discount rate) 
were coded 11. Then the four time preferences scores were added up and normalized 
between 0 and 1. This method allows comparability between daily and monthly discount 
rates.  
To capture the present bias of individuals two dummy variables were created. Firstly, 
presentbias_d was coded 1 if subjects had higher switching points in Tasks 1 compared 
to Task 2, and 0 otherwise. In other words, present biased subjects prefer the shorter 
time horizon. A second present bias dummy variable (presentbias_m) was constructed 
for Tasks 3 and 4. Similarly, the variable was coded 1 had a switching point later in task 
3 compared to task 4.  
In the risk task subjects had to decide between Option 1, which always offered a sure 
payment of 100 Peruvian Soles and Option 2, a risky option where earnings were 
dependent on the outcome of a coin toss. Once a subject choose Option 2 in any row the 
94 
 
game stopped there19. The purpose of this task was to elicit the switching point where 
subjects move from the sure payment to the risky option. This gives an indication of the 
individual subject’s level of risk aversion, σ, where a large σ indicates a larger degree of 
risk aversion. For example, if the subject chooses Option 1 in row 3 but Option 2 in row 
4, his or her risk preference can be represented as 
1001−𝜎
1−𝜎
 ≥ 0.5* 
2201−𝜎
1−𝜎
 + 0.5* 
01−𝜎
1−𝜎
 and  
1001−𝜎
1−𝜎
 ≤ 0.5* 
2301−𝜎
1−𝜎
 + 0.5* 
01−𝜎
1−𝜎
. Solving the two equations simultaneously, the interval 
for this individuals’ risk aversion parameter is 0.132 < σ≤ 0.167. The risk aversion 
variable is coded 0 for the lowest σ, while subjects that never chose Option 2 were coded 
6. As opposed to standard laboratory experiments, the tasks on this field study were not 
incentivised. 
 
6. Empirical Method 
To understand the role of risk and time preferences of parents in educational 
expectations, we employ the following estimation model:  
𝐸𝑖𝑗 = α0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑗 represents the measure of educational expectation of the ith mother of child j; 
while 𝐻𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖𝑗and 𝑃𝑖 represent variables at the household, child and parent level, 
                                                          
19 It is important to note that our experimental tasks were not incentivised. Brañas et al. 
(2019) has shown that incentivising or not does not affect the elicitation of risk and time 
preferences using data from Nigeria and Honduras. 
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respectively. 𝐸𝑖𝑗 takes on the values from 0 to 10 with 0 representing low expectations 
(no education) while 10 the highest level (completed university education).  
𝐻𝑖includes the preference parameters, σ (risk aversion), r (discount rate) and δ (present 
bias). Household wealth is represented by weakly household income. The numbers of 
children are also included to control for the effect of competition among children in the 
household for the educational investment. 𝐶𝑖𝑗 includes a set of characteristics of the child 
j from household i such as age and gender. 𝑃𝑖  includes parental characteristics of the 
household such as mother’s and father’s achieved highest achieved education level and 
mother’s age. For the estimation, we cluster standard errors at the household level which 
is essentially the mother’s identifier.  
 
7. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 includes the distribution of children expectations and the level of education of 
the parents. To elicit expectations, parents were asked ‘What is the maximum 
educational level you think your child can reach?’. Almost 70% of the sample of children 
between the ages 0 and 14 are expected to attend university, 20% are expected to 
participate in vocational education, while 3.5% expect their child to attend below 
vocational level education. About 6% of our sample of children were given an uncertain 
answer measured by the ‘Don’t know’ option. These expectations on children contrast 
with parents’ own achieved education levels, which shows that in total 92% of mothers 
and 91% of fathers only attained secondary or lower levels of education.   
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Table 2. Child expectations and parental expectations distribution20 
Child Expectations (% of total)  
Secondary or below 3.4% 
Vocational  20.8% 
University 69.2% 
Don't know 5.7% 
  
Mother's education level (% of total)  
Secondary or below 92.2% 
Vocational  6.9% 
University 0.9% 
  
Father's education level (% of total)  
Secondary or below 91.3% 
Vocational  7.7% 
University 1.0% 
 
Table 3 includes descriptive statistics of preference parameters of beneficiary mothers 
participating in the study and other socio-economic characteristics. It is often considered 
that in developing countries household heads make decisions for schooling attainment; 
however, this study only has preference and expectations data from the mothers. The 
mean maternal risk aversion parameter, σ, is 0.73 (out of 1). High degree of risk aversion 
among rural communities in developing countries is consistent with the literature (e.g. 
                                                          
20 According to the UNESCO Institute For Statistics, in Peru the average national share of population 
with secondary or lower educational attainment is around 79% for both males and females. Our field 
study was conducted in a rural state of Peru that may explain the higher ratio of individuals with such 
attainment.   
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Barr 2003; Jacobson & Petrie 2009). The mean value of the implied discount rate 
parameter, r, used by our sample of mothers to discount future payments is 0.49 (out of 
1), which suggest a degree of moderate impatience. Generally, in the literature the 
evidence on whether poor people are more impatient is mixed (see Cardenas and 
Carpenter (2006) for a review). 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Risk and Time preferences of Mothers   
Risk aversion parameter (σ) 0.73 0.39 
Discount rate parameter (r) 0.49 0.25 
Present Bias (δ) – Daily 0.60 0.48 
Present Bias (δ) – Monthly 0.42 0.49 
   
Child Characteristics   
Gender (Female=1) 0.49 0.49 
Age 7.63 3.97 
   
Parental Characteristics   
Mother's age 36.32 8.28 
   
Household Characteristics   
Weekly household income 206.33 147.75 
Number of children in hh. (age 0-14) 3.29 1.69 
   
No. of surveys 1712  
No. of children 4400  
 
Half of the children in the sample are female with an average age of 7.5. The average 
age of sampled mothers was 32.2 years old. As for the wealth indicators, the mean 
household weekly income in our sample is 206.33 Peruvian Soles, while the median is 
180 Soles21.  
                                                          
21 Equivalent of $62 (mean) and $54 (median) per week. 
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8. Results 
The estimation results for the determinants of child expectations are shown in Table 4. 
Column 1 shows the results for all children in the sample. The results show that after 
controlling for child, parental and household characteristics the degree of risk aversion 
(σ) is positively, while the daily discount rate (r) is negatively associated with 
expectations (Column 1). Both coefficients are statistically significant (p<0.01). The 
positive significant results between expectations and risk aversion shows that parents 
with high levels of risk aversion report higher expectations about their children’s 
education as they likely perceive education for their children a less risky option. 
Therefore, parents consider high levels of investment in education safer. Another 
explanation is the fact that all subjects are participants of the JUNTOS conditional cash 
transfer programme. If at early stages of childhood mothers have low educational 
expectations and low expected returns to schooling, such expectations may affect how 
much parents will invest in education, starting with  whether or not to send their 
children to school at all.   
The lack of school attendance also creates the risk of losing out on monthly cash transfers 
which can significantly affect the budget of a low-income household. A risk averse parent 
makes sure that their child has adequate school attendance. Therefore, the main aim  of 
CCT programmes of increasing attendance, may have positive spill-overs on educational 
expectations by raising such expectations beyond primary education. This may have 
important policy implications as it shows the effectiveness of conditional cash transfer 
programmes of improving human capital accumulation.  
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Columns (2) and (3) show the impact of risk preferences across age groups. Parental risk 
aversion of young children (0-7 years old) has relatively lower correlation with 
expectations compared to risk aversion for older children (8-14 year olds).  An important 
determinant of perceived returns to education and expectations is lack of information, 
which increases the uncertainty of parents about the returns to schooling in the 
community. As the child gets older this uncertainty decreases. Thus, more information 
available about a child and longer exposure to observed educational outcomes at older 
age may explain our results on risk aversion between age groups.   
Our finding on time preferences (daily discount rate) is in line with prior predictions. 
Impatient parents (high discount rate) tend to have lower expectations compared to 
patient parents (low discount rate). This is due to the fact that parents with high 
discount rate are expecting immediate financial gains from educational attainment of 
their children, and therefore they may tend to underinvest given that they are not 
patient enough to wait for the return. Impatient parents of younger children have lower 
expectations compared to impatient parents of older children (Table 3, Columns 2 and 
3). 
          Table 4. Determinants of Child Expectations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Expectations Expectations Expectations 
 Full sample Age (0-7) Age (7-14) 
    
Risk (σ) 0.064*** 0.054*** 0.072*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) 
Time discounting (r) -0.589*** -0.526*** -0.636*** 
 (0.140) (0.176) (0.166) 
Present bias_days -0.122* -0.122 -0.122 
 (0.069) (0.079) (0.084) 
Present bias_months -0.130 -0.091 -0.151 
 (0.082) (0.091) (0.103) 
Child age 0.003 0.021* 0.000 
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 (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) 
Female child -0.016 -0.030 0.007 
 (0.039) (0.055) (0.058) 
Age 0.005 0.001 0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Education_mother 0.059*** 0.063** 0.057** 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.024) 
Education_father 0.036* 0.062** 0.013 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) 
Household income 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No.of sibilings -0.077*** -0.059** -0.088*** 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) 
Constant 8.905*** 8.800*** 8.923*** 
 (0.220) (0.272) (0.295) 
Observations 3,332 1,561 1,771 
F 6.87 5.59 5.41 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.061 0.064 0.061 
Robust standard errors, in parentheses, have been  
clustered at the household (mother) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Both present bias dummies show a negative relationship with expectations throughout. 
However, we only observe a weakly significant relationship (p<0.1) for the full sample 
at the one-day interval. The negative coefficients are in line with prior predictions. 
Parents affected by present bias may weight the utility from the present consumption 
higher than the utilities derived from consumptions at future dates. This in turn will 
result in lower expectations on educational attainment.  
The other parental and household characteristics are significant and meeting our prior 
expectations as follows. Parents with higher levels of education tend to have higher 
expectations about their children’s educational choices than those with lower levels of 
education. However, the coefficient on mothers’ attainment have a larger impact on 
expectation at both the full sample and the different age groups. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the survey respondents were always the mothers therefore their own 
experience with the education system play a larger role in determining expectation for 
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their children. The weekly household income is positively associated with educational 
expectations. It is likely that wealthy household tend to expect more from their children 
due to the available household resources. In addition, our results show that when there 
are higher number of siblings in the household expectations on educational attainment 
tends to significantly decline. This is consistent with the literature from developing 
countries on the propensity to concentrate resources on one child (Barrera-Osorio et al. 
2011, Akresh et al. 2012). Due to the high opportunity and other costs associated with 
schooling and large average family sizes it is often only possible to send those children 
to school that are perceived to be the most likely to bring higher returns to the household. 
The perceived high opportunity costs are likely to drive educational expectations about 
the child. Another explanation to lower expectation with increasing number of siblings 
is that parents become more realistic with regards their expectations once they have 
more information available on the siblings’ educational outcomes.  
9. Conclusion  
This paper investigates the relationship between parental expectations on child 
educational attainment and risk and time preferences of beneficiary mothers in rural 
Peru. First, after controlling for a set of household, parental and child characteristics we 
find that our risk-aversion parameter, sigma, is significantly and positively related to 
expectations on education attainment. This can be interpreted that our sample of 
mothers does not consider education as a risky investment in rural Peru. Instead they 
perceive education as a safe option and fear of losing out on higher returns resulting 
from high educational attainment.  
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Second, higher degree of impatience (higher discount rate) among parents is 
significantly correlated with low expectations on children attainment. Parents with high 
discount rates are expecting immediate financial gains from low education attainment 
of their children and only expect them to have higher attainment if their perceived 
return on education is high.  
Finally, we found that expectations are not significantly affected by present bias, 
however the relationship is negative. This suggests that parents that weight the utility 
from present consumption higher than the utilities derived from future consumptions 
have lower expectations and may allocate less resources for future educational 
investments.  
One of the limitations of our study is that the discount rates are highly affected by the 
pay-offs and the time dimensions of the task. Therefore, it is recommended that future 
studies explore the relationship between expectations and risk and time preferences 
using different parameters. The other limitation is that our subject pool only considered 
mothers, while it may be the father or the household head whose expectations determine 
future child outcomes. This can be a valid assumption in developing countries and needs 
further investigation.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1. Task 1 – Time Preferences 
What do you prefer?   
  Option1 Day (t) Option 2 Day (t) Discount Rate 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 100 day after tomorrow 1 r = 0 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 110 day after tomorrow 1 0 < r ≤  0.1 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 120 day after tomorrow 1 0.1 < r ≤  0.2 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 130 day after tomorrow 1 0.2  < r ≤  0.3 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 140 day after tomorrow 1 0.3 < r  ≤  0.4 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 150 day after tomorrow 1 0.4 < r ≤  0.5 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 160 day after tomorrow 1 0.5 < r  ≤  0.6 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 170 day after tomorrow 1 0.6 < r ≤  0.7 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 180 day after tomorrow 1 0.7  < r ≤ 0.8 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 190 day after tomorrow 1 0.8 < r ≤  0.9 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 200 day after tomorrow 1 0.9 < r ≤  1 
     1 < r ≤  ∞ 
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Figure 2. Task 2. – Time Preferences 
What do you prefer?   
 Option1 Days (t) Option 2 Days (t) Discount Rate 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 100 in six months and one day 181 r = 0 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 110 in six months and one day 181 0 < r ≤  0.1 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 120 in six months and one day 181 0.1 < r ≤  0.2 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 130 in six months and one day 181 0.2  < r ≤  0.3 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 140 in six months and one day 181 0.3 < r  ≤  0.4 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 150 in six months and one day 181 0.4 < r ≤  0.5 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 160 in six months and one day 181 0.5 < r  ≤  0.6 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 170 in six months and one day 181 0.6 < r ≤  0.7 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 180 in six months and one day 181 0.7  < r ≤ 0.8 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 190 in six months and one day 181 0.8 < r ≤  0.9 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 180 S/. 200 in six months and one day 181 0.9 < r ≤  1 
     1 < r ≤  ∞ 
 
 
Figure 3. Task 3. – Time Preferences 
What do you prefer?   
 Option1 Months (t) Option 2 Months (t) Discount Rate 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 100 in six months 6 r = 0  
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 110 in six months 6 0 < r ≤  0.016 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 120 in six months 6 0.016 < r ≤  0.031 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 130 in six months 6 0.031  < r ≤  0.045 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 140 in six months 6  0.045 < r  ≤  0.058 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 150 in six months 6 0.058 < r ≤  0.070 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 160 in six months 6 0.070 < r  ≤  0.081 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 170 in six months 6  0.081 < r ≤  0.092 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 180 in six months 6  0.092 < r ≤ 0.103 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 190 in six months 6  0.103 < r ≤  0.113 
Receive… S/. 100 tomorrow 0 S/. 200 in six months 6 0.113 < r ≤  0.122 
      0.122 < r ≤  ∞ 
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Figure 4. Task 4. – Time Preferences 
What do you prefer?   
 Option1 Months (t) Option 2 Months (t) Discount Rate 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 100 in twelve months 12 r = 0  
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 110 in twelve months 12 0 < r ≤  0.016 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 120 in twelve months 12 0.016 < r ≤  0.031 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 130 in twelve months 12 0.031  < r ≤  0.045 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 140 in twelve months 12  0.045 < r  ≤  0.058 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 150 in twelve months 12 0.058 < r ≤  0.070 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 160 in twelve months 12 0.070 < r  ≤  0.081 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 170 in twelve months 12  0.081 < r ≤  0.092 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 180 in twelve months 12  0.092 < r ≤ 0.103 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 190 in twelve months 12  0.103 < r ≤  0.113 
Receive… S/. 100 in six months 6 S/. 200 in twelve months 12 0.113 < r ≤  0.122 
     0.122 < r ≤  ∞ 
 
 
Figure 5. Task 5. – Risk Preferences 
 What do you prefer?   
    Flip a coin and:   
 Receive… S/. 100 sure payment 1  S/. 200 if heads and 0 if tails 2 σ = 0 
 Receive… S/. 100 sure payment 1  S/. 210 if heads and 0 if tails 2 0 < σ ≤ 0.06 
 Receive… S/. 100 sure payment 1  S/. 220 if heads and 0 if tails 2 0.06 < σ ≤ 0.132 
 Receive… S/. 100 sure payment 1  S/. 230 if heads and 0 if tails 2 0.132< σ ≤ 0.167 
 Receive… S/. 100 sure payment 1  S/. 240 if heads and 0 if tails 2 0.167< σ ≤ 0.208 
 Receive… S/. 100 sure payment 1  S/. 250 if heads and 0 if tails 2 0.208 < σ ≤ 0.243 
      0.243 < σ ≤  ∞ 
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Chapter 3.  
Cognitive Reflection Test: Whom, How, When 
The use of the Cognitive Reflection Test as a covariate to explain behavior in Economics 
and Psychology experiments has significantly increased in the past few years. 
Experiments have shown its usefulness in predicting behavior. However, little is known 
about if the test is gender biased, whether incentives matter or how different 
implementation procedures impact outcomes. Here we report the results of a meta-study 
of 118 Cognitive Reflection Test studies comprising of 44,558 participants across 21 
countries. We find that there is a negative correlation between being female and the 
overall, and individual, correct answers to CRT questions. Monetary incentives do not 
impact performance. Regarding implementation procedures, taking the test at the end 
of the experiment negatively impacts performance. Students perform better compared 
to non-students. We obtain mixed evidence on whether the sequence of questions 
matters. Finally, we find that computerized tests marginally improve results. 
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1. Introduction 
In this meta-study we test for several of the empirical regularities regarding the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) reported in several Economics and 
Psychology experiments. We have a heterogenous sample of studies characterized by 
differences in geographical location, incentives, non-student samples, lab/field based, 
etc. We test for whether the reported gender differences hold and whether monetary 
incentives significantly impact the number of correct responses in the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (henceforth CRT). Our meta-study also compares the CRT results for 
student and non-student samples of participants. We also test for whether different 
procedures such as the timing of the CRT, the use of computerized settings, or increased 
exposure to the CRT over the years has any impact on the observed results. 
The CRT was first proposed by Frederick (2005) and since then has been extensively 
used in the Experimental Economics and Psychology literature. Frederick proposed the 
test based on a dual-system theory (e.g. Epstein 1994; Sloman 1996; Stanovich and West 
2000; Kahneman and Frederick 2002) made up of two cognitive processes: System 1, 
executed quickly without much reflection and System 2, more deliberate and requiring 
conscious thought and effort. The questions in the CRT have an immediate (intuitive) 
incorrect response (System 1). However, the correct response requires some deliberation, 
i.e. the activation of System 2. The standard CRT test consists of the following three 
questions: 
 A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? (Intuitive answer 10, correct answer 5). 
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 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? (Intuitive answer 100, correct answer 5). 
 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the 
patch to cover half of the lake? (Intuitive answer 24, correct answer 47).22 
Frederick (2005) found that individuals with high CRT scores are more patient and more 
willing to gamble in the domain of gains. He also provided evidence that the CRT scores 
are highly correlated with some other tests of analytic thinking (e.g. ACT, SAT and WPT) 
and that males on average score higher on the test. Toplak et al. (2011) claim that the 
CRT can be viewed as a combination of cognitive capacity, disposition for judgement and 
decision making. They argue that the CRT captures important characteristics of rational 
thinking that are not measured in other intelligence tests. Below we discuss the results 
from CRT related studies. 
Since Frederick (2005), several researchers have adopted the CRT as a measure of 
cognitive abilities and have studied its predictive power in decision making (e.g. 
Oechssler et al. 2009; Campitelli and Labollita 2010; Hoppe and Kusterer 2011; Besedes 
et al. 2012; Andersson et al. 2013; Moritz et al. 2013 etc.). Oechssler et al. (2009) 
investigate whether behavioral biases are related to cognitive abilities. Replicating 
Frederick (2005), they find that participants with low scores on the CRT are more likely 
to be subject to the conjunction fallacy and to conservatism in updating probabilities 
                                                          
22 We will refer to the first, second and third questions as "B&B” (Bat and Ball), “Machines" and 
“ Lillypad", respectively. 
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(also see Liberali et al. 2012; Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer 2016). Meanwhile, Bosch-
Doménech et al. (2014) find biological underpinning´s for CRT performance relating the 
2D:4D ratio and performance on the CRT. They find that a lower 2D:4D ratio (reflecting 
a relative higher exposure to testosterone) is significantly associated with higher scores 
on the CRT.   
The CRT has also been found to be a good predictor of the degree of strategic behavior 
in laboratory experiments (e.g. Brañas-Garza et al. 2012; Carpenter et al. 2013; Kiss et 
al. 2016 etc.). It is a useful test to measure strategic behavior as it not only captures 
reflective processes but also the ability to execute small computational tasks (Corgnet 
et al. 2015). Brañas-Garza et al. (2012) investigate the relationship between CRT 
outcomes and subject performance in the repeated feedback-free p-Beauty Contest Game 
(Nagel 1995), where a higher level of reasoning indicates better strategic behavior. They 
find that individuals with higher scores on the CRT choose numbers closer to the Nash 
equilibrium. Kiss et al. (2016) look at the effect of CRT on withdrawal decisions in an 
extended version of Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) bank-run game. They find that 
participants with higher cognitive abilities (as measured by the CRT) identify the 
dominant strategy when strategic uncertainty is present in the game. The above 
evidence indicates that the CRT could also help us in identifying strategically 
sophisticated subjects. 
It is now well established in the Behavioural Economics and Psychological literature 
that subjects with better cognitive abilities are other-regarding (e.g. Ben-Ner et al. 2004; 
Chen et al. 2013). In recent years the link between CRT scores and social preferences 
has been investigated (Corgnet et al. 2015; Peysakhovic and Rand 2015; Ponti and 
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Rodriguez-Lara 2015; Cueva-Herrero et al 2016). Corgnet et al. (2015) find that 
individuals with a high CRT score are more likely to make altruistic choices in simple 
non-strategic decisions. Their choices increase social welfare by increasing the other 
person’s payoff at a very low (or none) cost for the individual. On the other hand, the 
choices of less reflective subjects are more correlated with spiteful motives. 
There is also evidence regarding the relationship between behavioral biases and 
cognitive reflection in the literature on behavioral finance and experimental asset 
markets (e.g. Cheung et al. 2014; Noussair et al. 2014; Corgnet et al. 2014; Bosch-Rosa 
et al. 2015; Holt et al. 2015 etc.). Corgnet et al. (2014) find that high CRT subjects earned 
significantly more on average than the initial value of their portfolio while low CRT 
subjects earned less. Interestingly, subjects with low CRT scores were net purchasers 
(sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental value while the 
opposite was true for subjects with high CRT scores. Bosch-Rosa et al. (2015) show that 
if subjects with only low cognitive abilities are trading in an experimental asset market 
it will lead to bubble formation. Further, in markets with only highly cognitive 
individuals assets trade close to their fundamental values. In a recent paper Holt et al. 
(2015) study gender differences in an experimental asset market where participants 
answer the standard CRT questions (with an additional mathematical question). 
Though they observe no gender differences in bubble formation, they find that male 
subjects performed better on all questions, and the difference was largest for the more 
mathematical (speed) question. 
Another important issue is regarding gender differences. It has been shown that males 
consistently score significantly higher on the CRT than females (e.g. Frederick 2005; 
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Hoppe and Kusterer 2011; Holt et al. 2015; Cueva-Herrero et al. 2016 etc.). This agrees 
with the findings in the experimental literature that show that males have higher 
mathematical abilities and score higher than females on math tests (e.g. Benbow and 
Stanley 1980; Aiken 1986-1987; Benbow et al. 2000; Mau and Lynn 2010 etc.). 
An important question in both Economics and Psychology is regarding the use of 
incentives in experiments. The effect of incentives on CRT responses has not been 
directly studied so far. The available evidence regarding how incentives affect outcomes 
is split, i.e. whether incentives matter or not is context dependent. For example, Riedel 
et al. (1988), Scott et al. (1988) and Duckworth et al. (2011) find a positive relationship 
between monetary incentives and performance levels meanwhile, others (e.g. Jenkins et 
al. 1998; Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Bonner and Sprinkle 2002) find evidence to the 
contrary. Studies that reject the impact of monetary incentives on performance outcomes 
argue that while it increases effort, it either doesn’t improve performance at all or it only 
increases the performance of those who possess better cognitive abilities (Awasthi and 
Pratt 1990)23. 
Another issue has to do with external validity of laboratory experiments. That is, it is 
not clear as to how much the results from the laboratory (with university students) can 
be extrapolated to choices made by non-students. The evidence, again, is mixed. That is, 
there are mixed views on whether studies conducted with (volunteering) university 
                                                          
23 The cognitive characteristic examined by Awasthi and Pratt (1990) is perceptual differentiation (PD) 
i.e. an individual's ability to perceptually abstract from a complex setting certain familiar concepts or 
relationships. 
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students provide reliable results (Peterson 2001; Levitt and List 2007; Falk and 
Heckman 2009; Falk et al. 2013; Exadaktylos et al. 2013). Common objections are that 
student subject pool sample sizes are small and not representative. Given our large 
sample we can address this issue in the context of the CRT. 
We also look at the effect of positioning of the CRT compared to the main experiment. If 
CRT is of interest in finding covariation with decisions made in the experiment then it 
becomes important to understand whether timing matters. If cognitive load diminishes 
decision making ability then we would expect better performance the earlier is the test 
taken in the experiment. 
Finally, we study the issue of prior experience with the CRT. This has to do with the 
point made by Toplak et al. (2014) where they argue that if the CRT is commonly used 
it is probable that individuals may have become familiarized with it. Figure 1 presents 
the total number of working and published papers included in our analysis over the 
period of 2007 to 2015. It is clear that in recent years the CRT has been increasingly 
used. The direct concern raised by Toplak et al (2014) is difficult to test with our data as 
we have no information on repeat takers of CRT. Further, note that this matter is 
confounded with the frequent use of the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT henceforth) 
platform for running experiments (for review on AMT see Paolacci et al. 2010; 
Buhrmester et al. 2011; Goodman et al. 2013). Given this study whether the year a 
particular CRT study was conducted and whether it was conducted on line affected test 
scores. This issue is also related whether different administration modes, i.e. 
computerized or paper-and-pencil, provide significantly different outcomes (e.g. George 
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et al. 1992; King and Miles 1995; Cole et al. 2006 etc.). We will also be studying this with 
our data. Given the above we can formulate our main hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: We expect that the results from our show that the CRT is gender biased. 
That is, males consistently perform better than females. 
Hypothesis 2: Given that the evidence regarding incentives is mixed we expect no effect 
of incentives on CRT responses. 
Hypothesis 3: A priori one would expect no difference between the student and non-
student population. 
Hypothesis 4: If cognitive load diminishes decision making ability then we would 
expect better performance the earlier is the test taken in the experiment. 
Hypothesis 5: Performance in the test should improve as it is increasingly used. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the procedures and techniques used 
for data collection. Section 3 provides the results. Section 4 concludes. All additional 
information is in the Appendix. 
 
2. Procedures 
2.1. Data collection 
The information and data on the CRT were obtained through two channels. First, an e-
mail inviting members of the Economic Science Association (ESA) was sent. In addition, 
a reminder e-mail was sent before the process was closed in June 2015. Respondents 
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were provided with an online survey where they could input information about their 
study. Figure A1 (Appendix 2) presents a screen shot of the actual questionnaire that 
researchers were asked to fill out. 
Second, we searched for research articles using the phrase “Cognitive Reflection Test” 
on Google Scholar. If an article was identified as one where the CRT was conducted the 
corresponding author was e-mailed the survey. The researchers were asked to respond 
to the following questions on the survey: 
 Total Number of CRT participants (and the number of females among the total). 
 How many of the total answered the B&B, Machines, and Lillypad questions 
correctly (and the number of females among them). 
 Out of the total how many participants answered all Three, Two or One 
question(s) correctly (and the number of females among them). 
 Whether the subjects received monetary incentives for correct answers. 
 Whether the CRT was computerized or it was a paper and pencil test. 
 The order of the CRT questions. 
 Whether the CRT was conducted before, in-between or after the experiment. 
We contacted 190 authors through e-mail and received information on 118 studies (62%) 
in total through filling out the survey (in some cases the authors had multiple studies). 
The corresponding authors we contacted (based on our Google Scholar search) represent 
roughly all the papers we could identify that used the CRT. Due to a considerable 
number of invitees declining to participate, our study may be hampered by self-selection 
bias. However, some degree of self-selection when inviting researchers to participate in 
a meta-analysis is almost inevitable. We still managed to obtain studies from a wide 
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range of disciplines, both published and unpublished, and have considerable 
heterogeneity in our data.24 
 
2.2. Sample creation 
Appendix B provides a list of all research articles included in our analysis. Some 
research papers in our meta-analysis include two or more CRT studies. Overall our data 
comprises of 118 studies with 44,558 participants between the years 2007 and 2015. The 
articles represent a wide range of disciplines including Economics (58.1% of studies), 
Psychology (33.3%) and Management (2.8%) with researchers from 21 different 
countries25. The largest number of studies was conducted in the USA and Germany, 42 
and 15, respectively. The study with the lowest number of observations was 40, while 
the study with the most had 4,312. Table 1 includes a breakdown regarding the number 
of observations available in each category in our sample. 
The full sample of 44,558 subjects was broken down into further sub-categories. These 
were: 
 Female (vs Male=0). 
                                                          
24 However, we did not ask for papers for a specific purpose (e.g. link between the CRT and playing 
the Nash Equilibrium). In this sense we may expect less self-selection.  
25 These countries include (in alphabetical order): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. 
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 Monetary incentives (whether the experimenter paid monetary incentives for 
correct answers). 
 Students (vs Non-students=0). 
 Position (whether the CRT was conducted before, in-between or after 
experiments). 
 Visibility (the year in which the studies were conducted, see also Table 4). 
 Sequence (the order in which the CRT questions were asked). 
 Computerized (vs paper and pencil=0). 
 
  
Distribution        
(full sample) 
Distribution              
(regression) 
Number of studies 118 118 
Total number of observations 44,558 39,603 
N (Bat and Ball, Machines, Lillypad correct answers) 41,004 38,031 
Bat and Ball correct 31.75% 32.24% 
Machines correct 40.24% 40.84% 
Lillypad correct 47.78% 48.59% 
N (3,2,1 and None correct answers) 44,558 39,603 
All 3 answers correct 18.17% 18.64% 
Only 2 answers correct 21.12% 21.45% 
Only 1 answers correct 23.18% 23.33% 
None of the answers correct 37.54% 36.57% 
N (gender) 41,705 39,603 
Female 52.76% 52.89% 
Male 47.24% 47.11% 
N (monetary incentives)  44,558 39,603 
Incentivized  14.67% 15.82% 
Non-Incentivized 85.33% 84.18% 
N (student) 43,684 39,603 
Student 42.28% 41.42% 
Non-Student 57.72% 58.58% 
N (position of the test) 44,558 39,603 
CRT took place before the experiment 37.66% 34.77% 
CRT took place after the experiment 44.58% 46.46% 
CRT took place in-between experiments 17.75% 18.77% 
N (sequence of the questions) 44,558 39,603 
Questions asked in standard sequence (B&B, Machines, Lillypad) 83.78% 84.92% 
Questions asked in randomized sequence 11.64% 13.09% 
Questions asked in B&B; Lilly Pad; Machines sequence  0.90% 1.01% 
Questions asked in Machines; Lilly Pad; B&B sequence  2.82% 0% 
Table 1. Data Distribution 
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2.3. Empirical strategy 
We use OLS regressions to estimate the relationship between CRT outcomes and the list 
of variables defined earlier.26 We use the OLS as the interpretation of its coefficients is 
direct. The robust standard errors are clustered around study ID’s. Our meta-analysis 
includes 118 studies with substantial heterogeneity (e.g. paper and pencil/computerized; 
incentivized/non-incentivized etc.). In order to check for the robustness of our analysis 
we re-run our main regressions (Table 3) with six additional sub-samples (see Appendix): 
 A sub-sample including female subjects only (Appendix Table ER1). In section 3.1 
we analyze the impact of gender differences on CRT results. 
 A sub-sample excluding studies where monetary incentives were used to reward 
correct answers (Appendix Table ER2). In section 3.2 we analyze the impact of 
monetary incentives on CRT performance. 
 A sub-sample comprised of non-students (Appendix Table ER3). In section 3.3 we 
analyze the difference in CRT results between university student samples and 
samples including non-students. 
                                                          
26 Other statistical models such as probit and logit provide similar results (see Appendix). 
Questions asked in Lilly Pad; B&B; Machines sequence  0.87% 0.97% 
N (computerized or paper and pencil) 42,797 39,603 
Computerized 87.91% 89.65% 
Paper and Pencil 12.09% 10.35% 
N (country information) 44,217 39,603 
Anglo-Saxon  49.65% 46.59% 
Europe 41.65% 43.70% 
Rest of the world 8.70% 9.71% 
121 
 
 A sub-sample excluding the studies where experiments were not conducted 
(Appendix Table ER4). In section 3.4 we analyze the impact of positioning of the 
CRT compared to the main experiment (i.e. before, in-between or after). Our 
general sample includes studies where the researchers did not run experiments. 
Having these observations in our sample could potentially lead to biased 
estimates. Further, by excluding these observations we can isolate the effect of 
these studies on the positioning of the CRT test. 
 A sub-sample excluding studies where the experimenters used Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Appendix Table ER5). In section 3.5 we discuss subjects’ 
exposure to the CRT over the years. Popular online experimental platforms such 
as the AMT may have made the test more visible over the years. Further, the ease 
of access to the correct answers raises important methodological concerns27. 
 A sub-sample excluding the studies where the sequence of the questions were 
randomly determined (Appendix Table ER6). In section 3.6 we analyze the effect 
of the CRT question sequences on test outcomes. We divide our full sample 
between standard sequence (i.e. B&B, Machines, Lillypad) and other sequences. 
The general sample however includes studies where the sequence of questions is 
randomly determined. There is a 1 in 6 chance that randomization generates a 
standard sequence. By excluding random sequences we can isolate the effect of 
having standardized sequences in the other sequence sub-sample.  
 
 
                                                          
27 We instantly obtained answers to all three questions through Google search. 
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Table 2. Mean test scores  
  B&B Machines Lillypad  None 1 2 3 
         
Gender         
Male 38.37% 50.43% 59.02%  27.01% 22.78% 25.00% 25.21% 
Female 26.70% 32.18% 39.18%  45.09% 23.83% 18.29% 12.79% 
         
Monetary incentives         
No monetary incentives 31.74% 39.50% 47.14%  37.82% 23.30% 20.83% 18.06% 
Monetary incentives 34.76% 47.60% 55.95%  29.96% 23.53% 24.77% 21.74% 
         
Non students vs. Students        
Non-Student 26.07% 39.21% 45.61%  40.60% 23.23% 20.05% 16.12% 
Student 40.68% 43.06% 52.68%  30.88% 23.48% 23.44% 22.21% 
         
CRT positioning         
Before  31.34% 41.94% 53.71%  33.70% 24.48% 23.04% 18.78% 
In-between 32.54% 38.38% 47.30%  37.73% 23.84% 20.92% 17.51% 
After  32.73% 41.08% 45.56%  38.25% 22.28% 20.48% 18.99% 
         
Question ordering         
Non-standard order 22.60% 33.07% 34.30%  51.02% 20.31% 15.82% 12.84% 
Standard order 34.01% 42.27% 51.23%  34.01% 23.87% 22.45% 19.67% 
         
Paper and Pencil vs. Computerized       
Paper and Pencil 37.14% 36.94% 42.86%  38.66% 22.78% 19.73% 18.83% 
Computerized 31.67% 41.28% 49.25%  36.33% 23.40% 21.65% 18.62% 
Notes: The first three columns refer to N= 38031, while the other four columns refer to N= 39603 
 
3. Results 
We now look at how the questions were answered both individually and overall. Figure 
2 shows a summary of the results for the correct answers (by question) and for the entire 
test. The left side refers to the number of correct answers for each question, i.e. B&B, 
Machines and Lillypad (N = 41,004). While the B&B question was answered correctly 
by 32% in the sample, the fraction rises to 48% for the Lillypad question. It is hard to 
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interpret what these proportions mean. Either the B&B question is more cognitively 
demanding for the subjects, or non-incentivized implementation (or cognitive laziness) 
may imply that subjects only answered the “more” intuitive questions first and did not 
bother answering the more cognitively difficult28. The two-tailed t-tests (equal/unequal 
variances) comparing the means of the B&B, Machines, Lillypad distributions reject the 
null hypothesis of equal means (p<0.01). 
Looking at the total number of correct answers (right hand side, Figure 2)29 we find that 
a third of the population lack reflective, or cognitive, abilities. Meanwhile, the remaining 
62% have at least some, including 18% that provide all correct answers. Two-tailed t-
tests (equal/unequal equal variances) comparing the distribution of the None, 1, 2, 3 
correct answers reject the null hypothesis of equal means everywhere (p<0.01). 
Next, we study in detail the determinants of correct answers to the CRT. Moreover, in 
order to better understand these estimates we run a series of additional regressions in 
Appendix 1. Specifically, we repeat the main regression using a subsample of females 
only (Table ER1), a subsample of studies without monetary incentives (Table ER2), a 
subsample of non-students (Table ER3), a subsample of studies without economic 
experiments (Table ER4), a subsample excluding Amazon Mechanical Turk studies 
(ATM, Table ER5) and lastly a subsample of study excluding CRTs with random order 
(Table ER6).  
 
                                                          
28 Note that under lack of incentives participants may choose not to answer the cognitively difficult 
question. 
29 Note that differences in the sample sizes are due to data availability. 
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Figure 2. The fraction of correct answers in the meta-study. 
 
 
3.1. Gender bias 
Table 2 shows that the CRT has a strong gender bias favoring males (N = 41,705; females 
52.76%). We find that: (i) males perform better in every single question, (ii) females are 
more likely to answer none of the questions correctly, and (iii) males are more likely to 
answer all three questions correctly.  
Importantly, gender differences persist in a regression (Table 3, row 1) even when we 
control for test characteristics (e.g. monetary incentives, computerized, student samples, 
positioning of the experiment etc.). Our results confirm Frederick (2005) (N = 3,428) who 
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showed that males perform better in the CRT (also see Oechssler et al. 2009; Hoppe and 
Kusterer 2011; Holt et al. 2015; Cueva-Herrero et al. 2016 etc.).  
We replicated the regressions in studies without incentives (Tables ER2), in a subsample 
of non-students (ER3), in studies without experiments (ER4), in Non-AMT studies 
(ER5), and in studies without randomly sorted questions (ER6). Our replications show 
that the gender bias remains negative and statistically significant (p<0.01) throughout. 
Hence, we find that all previous results hold.  
In sum, gender has an important impact on CRT performance and if used as a sorting 
criteria may bias the distribution of participants. This gives us our first result, 
Result 1: Our results strongly support the Hypothesis 1. CRT responses have a strong 
gender bias. The proportion of males is increasing with increase in the score. 
This is a useful find as knowing that the CRT has a strong male bias can be important 
for sample building. For instance, say that we would like to select subjects with certain 
characteristics from the sample. Our study suggests that using the 3-correct-answers 
criteria will give us twice as many males than females. This implies that we not only 
select highly cognitive individuals, but also that the sample is strongly biased towards 
males. 
Bosch-Rosa et al. (2015), for example, divide their subject pool between individuals with 
low and high cognitive abilities based on the CRT results in order to perform a later 
task. Our results suggest that their findings might be partly driven by gender effects. A 
similar problem arises in Brañas-Garza et al. (2012) where they find that high CRT 
scorers are more likely to play according to the Nash Equilibrium in the Beauty Contest 
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Game. This may again be due to the higher proportion of males rather than just an 
overall effect of high CRT scorers. 
3.2. Incentives 
The effect of financial incentives on human behavior has been a long debated issue in 
Economics and Psychology (for a review see Camerer and Hogarth 1999). The dominant 
argument in the experimental methodology is that incentives are important for profit 
maximizing individuals. In our case this would imply that the number of correct answers 
would improve under monetary incentives (14.67% of our sample).  
127 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  B&B Machines Lillypad None 1 2 3 
        
(1) female -0.113*** -0.177*** -0.197*** 0.179*** 0.009 -0.066*** -0.121*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
(2) monetary incentives -0.026 0.003 0.040 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.008 
 (0.046) (0.048) (0.049) (0.045) (0.016) (0.017) (0.040) 
(3) student 0.138*** -0.002 0.067* -0.089** 0.011 0.030** 0.047* 
 (0.035) (0.025) (0.039) (0.034) (0.008) (0.013) (0.024) 
(4a) in-between 
experiments  
-0.046 -0.007 -0.090* 0.059 0.002 -0.017 -0.043 
 (0.045) (0.035) (0.049) (0.040) (0.013) (0.014) (0.033) 
(4b) after the experiment -0.032 -0.009 -0.093** 0.060* -0.008 -0.026** -0.026 
 (0.037) (0.030) (0.038) (0.035) (0.009) (0.012) (0.026) 
(5) visibility 0.008 0.016*** 0.005 -0.005 -0.007*** 0.002 0.010** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
(6) standard sequence 0.103** 0.102*** 0.148*** -0.142*** 0.012 0.050*** 0.080*** 
 (0.040) (0.034) (0.043) (0.040) (0.012) (0.015) (0.031) 
(7) computerized 0.033 0.085* 0.108** -0.095** 0.013 0.050** 0.032 
 (0.038) (0.048) (0.051) (0.045) (0.012) (0.020) (0.032) 
Constant 0.184** 0.270*** 0.285*** 0.533*** 0.241*** 0.156*** 0.070 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.022) (0.030) (0.056) 
N 38031 38031 38031 39603 39603 39603 39603 
R2 0.045 0.052 0.071 0.067 0.003 0.015 0.038 
 
 
 
Table 3. Regression analysis 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The regressions also control for country by using two 
dummies: europe and anglo-saxon. 
 
128 
 
The regression analysis (row 2, Table 3) shows that the variable monetary incentives is 
not statistically significant at any of the common significance levels. This implies that 
paying subject for correct answers on the CRT does not increase performance levels.  
Our robustness checks show that effect of incentives are only marginally significant for 
the female subsample (Tables ER1), for non-students (ER3) and in studies without 
experiments (ER4); while the lack of-effect of monetary incentives remains persistent 
throughout in Non-AMT studies (ER5) and in studies without randomly sorted questions 
(ER6). Below we present our result,   
Result 2: Our results support Hypothesis 2. We find that overall incentives have no impact 
on CRT performance. 
Note that the role of incentives and the degree of cognition can also be important. For 
example, Awasthi and Pratt (1990) find that the effectiveness of monetary incentives 
depends on the cognitive skill of the decision maker. In their study monetary incentives 
were associated with higher performance only for higher cognition individuals. We 
cannot comment on whether there is a relation between cognition and incentives. One 
may also argue that the test was a marginal part of a larger study and payments were 
not salient (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Finally, we should point out that we lack 
specific details on how incentives were implemented and their magnitude. 
3.3. Students vs. non-students 
Economics experiments have been traditionally run with university students. This has 
raised an obvious question about external validity of experimental data (see Levitt and 
List 2007; Falk and Heckman 2009; Exadaktylos et al. 2013). Our sample includes 
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studies that were conducted with, and without, university students (42.28% of all 
observations). This allows us to check for whether there are population differences in 
the CRT.  
Overall we find that the student population performs better than non-students. We find 
that students score significantly better in the B&B and, only slightly better in the 
Machines and Lillypad question (Table 2). The results in Table 2 also show that 
university students are less likely to have all three questions answered incorrectly, while 
at the same time they are more likely to give two and three correct answers. Below we 
summarize our results, 
Table 3 (row 3) confirms the findings in Table 2. The student coefficient is statistically 
significant for the B&B (p<0.01) and Lillypad (p<0.1) questions implying that students 
are more likely to give correct answers to these two questions. In contrast, the coefficient 
for zero correct answers is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
implies that non-students on average are more likely to obtain all incorrect answers 
relative to students. Furthermore, students are more likely to have two (p<0.05) and all 
three (p<0.1) answers given correctly. Results on the high performance of students 
compared to non-students are likely to be derived from higher cognitive ability of 
students compared to average population (e.g. Pennycook et al. 2012). 
Our robustness checks show that these effects have similar signs but less statistical 
power for the female subsample (Table ER1), subsample without monetary incentives 
(ER3), in studies without experiments (ER4) and in studies without randomly sorted 
questions (ER6), however similar significance levels for the subsample using only Non-
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AMT studies (ER5). In sum, our results allow us to state that one can expect the average 
CRT scores to be higher when using student samples. 
Result 3: Hypothesis 3 is not supported. We find that students perform significantly better 
than non-students. 
 
3.4 When? 
If CRT is of interest in finding covariation with decisions made in the experiment then 
it becomes important to understand whether timing matters. In our sample the 
proportion of studies where the test was conducted before, in-between or after the 
experiment is 37.66%, 17.75% and 44.58%, respectively. A priori one would expect no 
differences. However, there are reasons why the timing may be important. The first is 
cognitive load. If students perform cognitively difficult tasks in the experiments then a 
later CRT would imply higher cognitive load and hence may affect CRT response rates. 
The second argument could be related to glucose depletion. It has been shown that brain 
activity is reliant on blood glucose levels as it affects the firing of neurons (Weiss 1986). 
Experimental tasks almost always require some form of cognition (reading instructions, 
answering questionnaires, quizzes etc.) and it would be reasonable to assume that 
glucose levels would be lower towards the end of the experiment. This would then 
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consequently imply that if the CRT is conducted at the end of the experimental then 
performance on the CRT should be negatively affected30. Below we present our results, 
The main message from our analysis is that CRT efficiency declines the later it is 
conducted. One sees that there are some differences in CRT performance depending 
upon whether it was conducted before, in-between or after the experiment (see rows 4a 
and 4b in Table 3). Conducting it in-between or after has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the Lillypad question (p<0.1 and p<0.05, respectively) (rows 4a and 
4b, Table 3). In addition, conducting it after is more likely to result in None (p<0.1) and 
less likely to have exactly two questions answered correctly (p<0.05). It is important to 
note that the after-the-experiment coefficient remains negative throughout (row 4b, 
Table 3). This suggests that conducting the CRTs after the experiments can potentially 
impact outcomes negatively.   
Note, however, that prior data includes studies where no experiments were conducted. 
We conducted further analysis by removing these studies from the sample. This gives us 
even stronger results (Table ER4, rows 4a and 4b). Now it is even less likely that subjects 
are to answer the B&B and Lillypad questions correctly if CRTs conducted in-between 
or after the experiments. This negative effect is lower for in-between experiments (p<0.05) 
and stronger for after the experiments (p<0.01) variables. The stronger negative effect 
for the variable after is coherent with the argument that glucose levels are being 
depleted as subjects are progressing through the experiment. Similarly, we observe that 
                                                          
30 People performing worse on the CRT at the end of the experiment can be also confounded by the fact 
that they may have had less time then. For example, the experiment running late. In addition, 
experiments that measure CRT at the end may be different and typically longer.  
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subjects are less likely to answer all three questions correctly both in-between and after 
experiments (both p<0.05) and more likely to have None (both p<0.05) (rows 4a and 4b, 
Table ER4).31 
Result 4: Our results support Hypothesis 4. Performance in the CRT improves the earlier 
the test administered in the experiment. The results are stronger excluding CRT 
implementation without an experiment. 
Whether it is cognitive load or glucose depletion it is important to know that 
performance in the test gets worse the later it is conducted in the experiment. It is known 
that that glucose levels (in the brain) play an important role in cognition. Effortful, 
controlled or executive processes and tasks (e.g. experiments) require more glucose than 
simpler, less effortful or automatic processes. When glucose levels are low, cerebral 
functioning is disrupted, producing numerous cognitive and behavioral deficits (Gailliot 
and Baumeister 2007). In sum, our results show that conducting the CRT after the 
experiment can have a negative effect on performance on the CRT32.   
 
 
 
                                                          
31 The robustness checks (Tables A3, A4, A6, A8) report similar results with varying degrees of 
significance.  
32 Poor performance may also be due to lack of effort, or leaving problems blank. We lack data on 
whether an incorrect answer is wrong or empty. We would like to thank Shane Frederick for pointing 
this out. 
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3.5. Exposure to the CRT over the years (visibility) 
Toplak et al. (2014) argue that the test in its original form is becoming increasingly 
popular and is perhaps losing its efficacy. This argument has validity if the student pool 
remains the same, or same subjects take the test on more than one occasion over their 
University life. The critique is of concern given the increased implementation of the CRT 
and if we are to believe in its predictive power. This issue is also related with the fact 
that some studies are conducted on-line. Answers to the CRT are easily available online 
and this sheds doubt on its efficacy using online studies. We investigate these issues 
below. 
In our regressions we used the variable visibility to describe the effect of exposure to the 
CRT over the years. The variable was generated by assigning the value 0 for studies 
conducted in 2005, 1 for 2006 and so on.  
 
In Table 3 (row 5) the variable visibility shows that the number of years of exposure has 
a positive impact on obtaining all three correct answers (p<0.05). Visibility negatively 
affects subjects answering only one question correctly (p<0.01), the coefficients on two 
and three correct answers turn positive but non-significant. No effect is found for None 
(p>0.1), i.e. exposure to the test is not decreasing the number of participants giving zero 
correct answers. In addition, we find that subjects are more likely to answer the 
Machines question correctly (p<0.01). Overall, some support (row 5, Table 3) is lent to 
the argument that years of exposure positively affect test outcomes. This effect, however, 
does not seem to be too large or persistent. The robustness checks provide similar weak 
findings for the exposure conjecture for the females only subsample (Table ER1), for non-
Note: The sample does not include any CRT study from 2015. 
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students (Table ER3), studies without economic experiments (Table ER4) and for studies 
excluding CRTs with random order (Table ER6). However, results show higher 
statistical power for the subsample of studies without monetary incentives (Table ER2).  
The earlier results could be confounded by the presence of AMT studies in our sample. 
AMT studies have the potential problem of immediate internet access enabling easily 
access to the answers for the standard questions. Our results change when AMT studies 
are excluded from the sample (row 5, Table ER5). We find that the previously significant 
effects on visibility are substantially weaker. All in all, we cannot observe a clear link 
between length of exposure and obtaining correct answers in the CRT. This gives us the 
result below, 
Result 5: Hypothesis 5 is not supported by our results. Excluding the AMT studies we 
find little support for the hypothesis that performance on the test improves as its 
exposure increases. 
Besides our main hypotheses we also check for how using the standard test sequence, or 
hand-run vs computerized implementation impacts CRT performance. Below we present 
these results. 
3.6. The sequence of questions 
The most commonly used sequence for the CRT is the one originally proposed by 
Frederick (2005), i.e. B&B, Machines, and Lillypad. A large proportion of our sample, 
83.78%, corresponds to this. It is thus reasonable to see whether the standard 
implementation of the sequence affects final outcomes. Looking at all the studies 
(standardized and random sequences) we see that subjects score better on the CRT when 
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the questions are presented in the standard order (Table 3). However, excluding studies 
with randomized and other forms of implementation we find that the effect of 
standardized implementation on CRT responses is marginal. We thus find no clear 
evidence on the effect of implementing the standard sequence upon outcomes. 
Looking at both the standard and randomized studies we find that the coefficient of 
standard sequence (row 6 - Table 3) is significant for the B&B (p<0.05), Machines 
(p<0.01) and Lillypad (p<0.01) questions. Further, the likelihood of None is much higher 
when the questions are not asked in the standard order (p<0.01). Likewise, subjects are 
more likely to answer two (p<0.01) or three (p<0.01) questions for the standard 
implementation. This result is, however, not robust. 
Note that the randomized sequences can also include questions asked in a standard way 
with probability 1 in 6. 33 Controlling for ‘other sequences’ and excluding studies where 
the order of the questions was randomized (11.64% of all of our observations) we find 
that the effect is marginal. In Table ER5 we replicated the main regressions excluding 
the studies with random sequences. The effect of standardized sequence on correct CRT 
responses is now marginal (Row 5, Table ER6). We cannot thus conclude that the 
standardized sequence would bias responses in the CRT. 
 
 
                                                          
33 If we consider that 1/6 of the randomized sample use standard sequence (roughly 2% of the sample) 
then we have that 85.7% of the sample uses the standard sequence and 14.3% non-standard (including 
5/6 of the random). 
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3.7 Hand run vs. computerized? 
Next we explore whether different administration modes effect performance on the test. 
In this case one would not expect that either method of implementation expects outcomes 
as it is a problem solving task not involving specific decisions (as occurs in most 
experiments). However, it is still interesting to study whether different forms of 
implementation affect final outcomes. 
We find (Table 3, row 7) that the dummy variable for computerized is only weakly 
significant. We do observe that subjects using computers are less likely (p<0.05) to fail 
all three questions and more likely to have two correct answers (p<0.05). Further, 
computerized implementation favors performance in the Machines (p<0.1) and Lillypad 
questions (p<0.05), however, we do not observe significant effects on the B&B question 
(p>0.1). We find this puzzling since one would expect that using paper and pencil would 
be more conducive to obtaining correct answers. 
Our robustness check show similar but slightly more significant results for the 
subsample of females (Table ER1) and the studies without monetary incentives (Table 
ER2) and the subsample of studies excluding CRTs with random order (Table ER4), 
however, the results show less statistical power for the subsample of non-students (Table 
ER3). Finally, the subsample of studies without economic experiments (Table ER4) and 
the subsample excluding Amazon Mechanical Turk studies (ATM, Table ER5) produce 
similar results. Note, however, we do not have information on whether participants 
could work out solutions on paper while responding to the computerized questions. 
Summarizing, we find that running the CRT on computers as compared to paper and 
pencil results in weakly significant positive effects on test scores. 
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4. Discussion 
The CRT has become increasingly popular in predicting behavior in Economics and 
Psychology experiments. However, there is no consensus on how the vastly different 
implementation procedures used, i.e. being incentivized or not, administered by paper-
and-pencil/computers/AMT, before/in-the-middle/after-an-experiment, etc. impact 
performance on the CRT. We only know from Frederick (2005) that the test has a strong 
(male) gender bias. The purpose of this study is to provide the first extensive look at how 
different implementation procedures for CRT may impact performance on the test. In 
the end if the CRT is useful for its predictive power then knowing whether any small 
variation in implementation procedures can affect outcomes is important. 
This study conducts a meta-survey of the methods employed in 118 studies (N = 44,558) 
that use CRT. Our main result reaffirms and provides additional findings regarding the 
gender bias result first reported in Frederick (2005). We find that males perform notably 
better in this test. This observation is important if, say, one is interested in constructing 
samples based on cognitive ability. This could lead to strong (gender) sample imbalance. 
For instance, if one uses three correct answers as a selection criteria then the sample is 
disproportionately biased towards males. Our second interesting finding is that we find 
no statistical evidence to support the argument that monetary incentives may play an 
important role in improving CRT performance. Albeit limited (as we lack data on the 
amount, or how, subjects were paid), this result is important as it tells us that incentives 
may not be strongly relevant for the implementation of the CRT. Regarding comparing 
student vs non-student populations we find that students are more likely to answer all 
three questions correctly compared to non-students, and less likely to have zero correct 
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answers. Again this tells us that the predictive power of the CRT may be affected by 
population differences. 
We also find that conducting the CRT after the experiments negatively effects test 
outcomes. Conducting the test later decreases the probability of obtaining correct 
answers; meanwhile, the probability of obtaining None is increased. This result is 
interesting as it points towards the fact that increased cognitive load could be an 
important determinant of performance in the CRT. Another interpretation of this result 
could be that it provides indirect support to the argument that glucose is important in 
cognitive tasks and cognition declines with time and effort. This is important as after 
removing studies where the researchers did not run experiments from the data we find 
even more significant results. We test for the year effect (visibility) and find no clear 
evidence that exposure positively affects tests results.  
Comparing test scores for hand-run vs. computerized tests we found a weakly positively 
significant effect of computerized implementation of the test. It is important to point out 
that we do not collect individual CRT scores but session information about CRT score 
distribution and do not control for individual characteristics such as cognitive ability, 
for example measured by IQ. This makes the analysis of individual characteristics 
challenging. Finally, we should add that, as is common with studies of this nature, a 
comprehensive list of data was not available. We lacked information about particular 
details (such as length of experiment, size of incentives, etc.) of each experiment in our 
meta-study. Knowing these details would have aided the interpretation of our results. 
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Figure A1. Screenshot of the Cognitive Reflection Test survey 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 B&B Machines Lillypad None 1 2 3 
        
(1) monetary incentives 0.012 -0.064 0.101* 0.000 -0.016 -0.037 0.053 
 (0.057) (0.064) (0.053) (0.066) (0.021) (0.030) (0.034) 
(2) student 0.127*** -0.027 0.039 -0.080** 0.031*** 0.029 0.020 
 (0.036) (0.026) (0.041) (0.039) (0.009) (0.018) (0.022) 
(3a) in-between 
experiments 
-0.046 0.009 -0.071 0.047 0.000 -0.015 -0.032 
 (0.047) (0.039) (0.053) (0.048) (0.014) (0.020) (0.030) 
(3b) after the experiment -0.045 -0.004 -0.092** 0.064 -0.010 -0.029 -0.025 
 (0.043) (0.035) (0.042) (0.043) (0.010) (0.018) (0.026) 
(4) visibility 0.009* 0.017*** 0.008 -0.007 
-
0.007*** 
0.004 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
(5) standard sequence 0.093** 0.106*** 0.151*** 
-
0.149*** 
0.017 0.059*** 0.072** 
 (0.041) (0.033) (0.044) (0.044) (0.013) (0.018) (0.028) 
(6) computerized 0.069* 0.100** 0.112** 
-
0.130*** 
0.032** 0.058*** 0.040 
 (0.038) (0.048) (0.045) (0.049) (0.015) (0.022) (0.025) 
Constant 0.053 0.072 0.039 0.759*** 0.228*** 0.086** -0.073* 
 (0.069) (0.073) (0.068) (0.080) (0.027) (0.036) (0.044) 
N 19995 19995 19995 20945 20945 20945 20945 
R2 0.026 0.020 0.032 0.031 0.005 0.009 0.013 
Table ER1. Robustness check: Females only 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The regressions also controls for the country 
of the study by using two dummy variables: europe and anglo-saxon.  
 
 
150 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  B&B Machines Lillypad None 1 2 3 
        
(1) female -0.107*** -0.176*** 
-
0.197*** 
0.181*** 0.004 
-
0.066*** 
-
0.118*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
(2) student 0.108*** -0.037 0.046 -0.066* 0.017** 0.027* 0.022 
 (0.036) (0.024) (0.040) (0.035) (0.007) (0.014) (0.023) 
(3a) in-between 
experiments 
-0.070 -0.055* -0.115** 0.083* 0.012 -0.026 -0.069** 
 (0.050) (0.030) (0.056) (0.045) (0.010) (0.016) (0.032) 
(3b) after the experiment -0.065 -0.047 
-
0.123*** 
0.088** -0.004 -0.033** -0.051* 
 (0.040) (0.033) (0.043) (0.038) (0.008) (0.014) (0.027) 
(4) visibility 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.011** -0.011** 
-
0.009*** 
0.004 0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
(5) standard sequence 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.162*** 
-
0.153*** 
0.006 0.053*** 0.094*** 
 (0.039) (0.032) (0.041) (0.040) (0.011) (0.015) (0.029) 
(6) computerized 0.063* 0.112** 0.154*** 
-
0.132*** 
0.016 0.066*** 0.051 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.044) (0.040) (0.013) (0.018) (0.032) 
Constant 0.271*** 0.390*** 0.365*** 0.428*** 0.246*** 0.177*** 0.149** 
 (0.088) (0.073) (0.084) (0.086) (0.026) (0.039) (0.062) 
N 31766 31766 31766 33338 33338 33338 33338 
R2 0.051 0.063 0.077 0.072 0.005 0.016 0.046 
Table ER2. Robustness check: excluding studies where the experimenters used monetary incentives to reward correct answers 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The regressions also controls for the 
country of the study by using two dummy variables: europe and anglo-saxon.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  B&B Machines Lillypad None 1 2 3 
        
(1) female -0.086*** -0.154*** 
-
0.178*** 
0.165*** -0.007 
-
0.061*** 
-
0.097*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
(2) monetary incentives 0.073 0.066 0.189** -0.108 -0.023** 0.058*** 0.072 
 (0.090) (0.097) (0.070) (0.088) (0.008) (0.020) (0.073) 
(3a) in-between 
experiments 
-0.051 -0.044 -0.093* 0.077* 0.017** -0.026* -0.069* 
 (0.046) (0.031) (0.048) (0.039) (0.008) (0.014) (0.035) 
(3b) after the experiment -0.032 -0.004 -0.049 0.045 -0.003 -0.011 -0.031 
 (0.023) (0.048) (0.042) (0.042) (0.007) (0.018) (0.028) 
(4) visibility 0.040*** 0.028 0.018 -0.022 
-
0.010*** 
0.003 0.029*** 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009) 
(5) standard sequence 0.189*** 0.156*** 0.199*** 
-
0.203*** 
-0.004 0.061*** 0.146*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.040) (0.012) (0.016) (0.031) 
(6) computerized -0.030 0.012 0.053 -0.057 0.041*** 0.035 -0.020 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.057) (0.063) (0.005) (0.022) (0.051) 
Constant -0.193** 0.088 0.006 0.817*** 0.278*** 0.085** -0.180** 
 (0.073) (0.111) (0.095) (0.097) (0.016) (0.037) (0.069) 
N 21983 21983 21983 23199 23199 23199 23199 
R2 0.041 0.044 0.078 0.071 0.007 0.017 0.042 
Table ER3. Robustness check: Regressions with non-student samples only 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The regressions also controls for the 
country of the study by using two dummy variables: europe and anglo-saxon.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  B&B Machines Lillypad None 1 2 3 
        
(1) female -0.107*** -0.167*** -0.186*** 0.170*** 0.009 -0.063*** -0.116*** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
(2) monetary incentives 0.046 0.091* 0.110* -0.081 -0.007 0.019 0.069* 
 (0.045) (0.051) (0.059) (0.052) (0.017) (0.021) (0.039) 
(3) student 0.108*** -0.026 0.051 -0.070 0.014 0.030* 0.026 
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.049) (0.042) (0.009) (0.017) (0.024) 
(4a) in-between experiments -0.130** -0.039 -0.140** 0.101** 0.015 -0.022 -0.093** 
 (0.055) (0.048) (0.058) (0.050) (0.015) (0.020) (0.036) 
(4b) after the experiment -0.109*** -0.037 -0.135*** 0.095** 0.005 -0.029 -0.071** 
 (0.041) (0.048) (0.047) (0.041) (0.012) (0.019) (0.028) 
(5) visibility 0.002 0.013* 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
(6) standard sequence 0.120*** 0.115*** 0.175*** 
-
0.164*** 
0.018 0.057*** 0.089*** 
 (0.038) (0.031) (0.041) (0.038) (0.012) (0.015) (0.029) 
(7) computerized 0.084** 0.136*** 0.145*** 
-
0.130*** 
0.000 0.055*** 0.076*** 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.048) (0.041) (0.010) (0.021) (0.024) 
Constant 0.392*** 0.441*** 0.396*** 0.399*** 0.195*** 0.170*** 0.237*** 
 (0.117) (0.100) (0.119) (0.114) (0.033) (0.047) (0.082) 
N 28268 28268 28268 28624 28624 28624 28624 
R2 0.056 0.068 0.086 0.086 0.002 0.019 0.048 
Table ER4. Robustness check: excluding the studies where the researchers did not run experiments 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The regressions also controls for the 
country of the study by using two dummy variables: europe and anglo-saxon.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Bat and Ball Machines Lillypad None 1 2 3 
        
(1) female -0.115*** -0.181*** -0.202*** 0.180*** 0.014** -0.070*** -0.124*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
(2) monetary incentives -0.022 0.006 0.045 -0.010 -0.002 0.002 0.010 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.047) (0.043) (0.014) (0.017) (0.036) 
(3) student 0.171*** 0.033 0.095** -0.113*** 0.001 0.031** 0.081*** 
 (0.041) (0.032) (0.046) (0.042) (0.009) (0.015) (0.029) 
(4a) in-between experiments -0.033 0.019 -0.088* 0.054 -0.010 -0.020 -0.023 
 (0.047) (0.041) (0.049) (0.042) (0.015) (0.016) (0.035) 
(4b) after the experiment -0.030 -0.001 -0.093* 0.055 -0.008 -0.025 -0.022 
 (0.045) (0.035) (0.047) (0.043) (0.009) (0.015) (0.032) 
(5) visibility 0.003 0.010* 0.001 -0.002 -0.005** 0.002 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
(6) standard sequence 0.059 0.059 0.118** -0.121*** 0.042** 0.042** 0.038 
 (0.041) (0.036) (0.046) (0.045) (0.016) (0.019) (0.029) 
(7) computerized 0.032 0.084* 0.106** -0.095** 0.014 0.049** 0.032 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.052) (0.046) (0.011) (0.020) (0.034) 
Constant 0.248*** 0.339*** 0.333*** 0.499*** 0.200*** 0.167*** 0.134** 
 (0.077) (0.075) (0.079) (0.081) (0.025) (0.035) (0.054) 
N 31200 31200 31200 31870 31870 31870 31870 
R2 0.049 0.057 0.068 0.064 0.003 0.013 0.043 
Table ER5. Robustness check: excluding those studies where the experimenters used Amazon Mechanical Turk for the tests 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The regressions also controls for the 
country of the study by using two dummy variables: europe and anglo-saxon.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  B&B Machines Lillypad None 1 2 3 
        
(1) female 
-0.117*** -0.176*** 
-
0.196*** 
0.176*** 0.012** 
-
0.065*** 
-
0.124*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) 
(2) computerized 0.021 0.077 0.098* -0.087* 0.013 0.048** 0.026 
 (0.601) (0.118) (0.062) (0.060) (0.274) (0.017) (0.443) 
(3) student 0.111*** -0.017 0.046 -0.063* 0.011 0.022* 0.030 
 (0.003) (0.520) (0.272) (0.079) (0.183) (0.083) (0.251) 
(4a) in-between 
experiments 
-0.055 0.000 -0.097* 0.064 -0.003 -0.019 -0.043 
 (0.266) (0.995) (0.073) (0.147) (0.845) (0.231) (0.242) 
(4b) after the experiment 0.007 0.027 -0.050 0.017 -0.010 -0.013 0.006 
 (0.859) (0.371) (0.193) (0.606) (0.236) (0.305) (0.826) 
(5) standard sequence -0.031 -0.087* -0.044 0.024 0.047* 0.001 -0.072** 
 (0.524) (0.068) (0.288) (0.664) (0.092) (0.956) (0.016) 
(6) monetary incentives -0.005 0.019 0.060 -0.025 -0.003 0.005 0.023 
 (0.918) (0.690) (0.224) (0.584) (0.867) (0.772) (0.570) 
(7) visibility 
0.007 0.014** 0.004 -0.004 
-
0.007*** 
0.002 0.009* 
 (0.214) (0.023) (0.532) (0.424) (0.004) (0.281) (0.096) 
Constant 0.317*** 0.460*** 0.475*** 0.373*** 0.204*** 0.201*** 0.222*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 32846 32846 32846 34418 34418 34418 34418 
R2 0.037 0.049 0.053 0.048 0.003 0.01 0.036 
Table ER6. Robustness check: Excluding studies where the sequence of questions was randomized 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The regressions also controls for the 
country of the study by using two dummy variables: europe and anglo-saxon. 
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Conclusions 
 
The thesis summarises the main findings of my doctoral studies at Middlesex University 
titled ‘Essays on Human Capital’.  It follows a top down approach by first discussing 
macroeconomic issues related to human capital and later looking into two specific micro 
level applications of human capital including mother’s educational expectations in 
developing countries and drivers of performance on a cognitive ability test.  
Human capital present in the labour force enhances labour productivity which leads to 
a higher equilibrium level of output. In turn, human capital has several determinants 
including education, health, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. The first chapter 
investigates one of the channels through which human capital may affect 
macroeconomic growth by looking at both the direct impact of the investments in 
education and the way educational resources are distributed within the society. The 
study recognises that it is not just the accumulation of human capital to play a role in 
determining growth but also the way human capital is distributed.  
The first part of the analysis relies on traditional growth models contrasting the 
conventional average year of schooling measures (BL,CS and PWT) with PISA test 
scores  and on a measure of educational inequality based on the Gini coefficient. The 
second part looks at the long run relationship of human capital accumulation and 
educational inequality on growth using a method that encompasses previous 
specifications and estimates both short-run and long run effects.  
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Overall, the results provide evidence that over the last few decades human capital, 
measured by education, has had an impact on economic growth. This is particularly true 
when using dynamic specification and controlling for cross-sectional heterogeneity and 
unknown common factors. The findings also support the view that governmental policies 
should focus on allocating national resources to education improving both accessibility 
to basic education in all parts of the society while at the same time improving the quality 
of education systems. 
Although resources spent on education are important to boost growth in developing 
countries, there are other issues derived from individuals’ preferences and behaviour 
that prevent efficient investment in education. One of these channels is parental 
expectations and their beliefs about their children. Parental expectations have 
substantial economic and social impact on the household. High expectations of parents 
lead children to set higher standards for their education and to make greater demands 
on themselves from an early age which in turn results in high achievement, better 
attendance and more positive attitudes towards school.  
In particular, the second chapter looks at how parents’ time discounting and degree of 
risk aversion impact expectation about their children’s educational attainment in a 
developing country setting. Education in developing countries is hypothesised to be a 
risky investment for households, while returns are only realised after some time in the 
future. Data from a field experiment in Peru was used to analyse the relationship 
between parental expectations on children education attainment and parental risk and 
time preferences among rural households.  
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After controlling for a set of household, parental and child characteristics it is found that 
the risk-aversion parameter (sigma) is significantly and positively related to 
expectations on schooling choices. This suggest the mothers in this study do not consider 
education as a risky investment in rural Peru. Instead, they perceive education as a safe 
option and fear of losing out on higher returns resulting from high educational 
attainment.  
It is also found that impatient parents (higher discount rate) tend to have lower 
expectations compared to patient parents. This is due to parents with high discount rate 
are expecting immediate financial gains from educational attainment of their children, 
and therefore they may tend to underinvest given that they are not patient enough to 
wait for the return. These results overall support the view that parental preferences 
may play a role in preventing efficient investment in childrens education in developing 
countries.  
As mentioned earlier, human capital has several aspects including, among others, 
cognitive abilities. The channels through which cognitive abilities promotes economic 
growth is mediated through multiple channels, for example, greater technological 
competitiveness, lower fertility, reduced burden of infectious diseases and increased 
domestic savings rates, whereas at the micro level cognitive abilities are said to explain 
individual decisions and behaviour. 
However, there is a lack of consensus in the literature on the best way of measuring it. 
Education has been often used as a proxy for cognitive abilities given that these abilities 
are not easily observed. There are an increasing number of alternative measures 
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proposed that are gaining popularity, one of which is the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT).  
The CRT was first proposed by Frederick (2005) and since then has been extensively 
used in the experimental economics and psychology literature. Frederick proposed the 
test based on a dual-system theory made up of two cognitive processes: System 1, 
executed quickly without much reflection and System 2, more deliberate and requiring 
conscious thought and effort. The questions in the CRT have an immediate (intuitive) 
incorrect response (System 1). However, the correct response requires some deliberation, 
i.e. the activation of System 2. 
The CRT’s use as a covariate to explain behavior and decisions has significantly 
increased in the past few years and experiments have shown its usefulness in predicting 
behavior. However, little is known about if the test is gender biased, whether incentives 
matter or how different implementation procedures impact outcomes. Therefore, in 
chapter three I present the results of a meta-study of 118 CRT studies comprising of 
44,558 participants across 21 countries.  
The results show that there is a negative correlation between being female and the 
overall, and individual, correct answers to CRT questions, whereas monetary incentives 
do not impact performance. Regarding implementation procedures, taking the test at 
the end of the experiment negatively impacts performance, while students generally 
perform better compared to non-students. The results also suggest mixed evidence on 
whether the sequence of questions matters or whether computerised tests improve 
results. Overall, the findings imply that the implementation of the test and the subject 
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pool may bias test results, which in turn can have an impact on behavioral or macro 
growth models.  
